> “This was an email address that looked like the real thing,” says Exempt, explaining the mechanics of how he tricked Charter Communications. “The real domain of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in Florida is jaxsheriff.org. We purchased jaxsheriff.us and then spoofed our number as the department’s, so that when we called them to verify receipt of the legal process, when they searched the number, it would come back to the sheriff’s office, giving them no reason to doubt it. We use real badge numbers and officer names as well.”
I'm honestly impressed. It's an interesting situation where the companies can only verify the same information that the hackers have access to
Name Space Within States:
------------------------
"locality" - cities, counties, parishes, and townships. Subdomains
under the "locality" would be like CI.<city>.<state>.US,
CO.<county>.<state>.US, or businesses. For example:
Petville.Marvista.CA.US.
"CI" - This branch is used for city government agencies and is a
subdomain under the "locality" name (like Los Angeles). For example:
Fire-Dept.CI.Los-Angeles.CA.US.
So you'd be counting on the sub-registrar of jacksonville.fl.us not to allow a registration for the fraudulent "business" of Sheriff, Inc. -- multiplied by every municipality across the country.
Many top-level TLDs have requirements you need to fulfill, .edu is a good example. Similarly you need to prove you're a local entity for many country-specific TLDs. At the end of the day though, this attack vector will always be there, no matter how diligent you are about it. Phishing is all about numbers and one in is often all you need.
I used to watch videos from social engineers like Jayson Street [0] and think "Is it really that easy to break into serious firms with social engineering?" and then the below happened:
- COVID lock down and I can't access my internal PC from home
- Call help desk line and say "hi, it's <ME> and I can't login. Btw, there is another person at the firm named <ME> (which was true) but that's not me HA HA."
- Help Desk removes 2FA
- Still doesn't work so I call back and reference the first call.
- Help Desk removes IP restriction
- This keeps happening (can't login, Help Desk removes something) until basically I can login with no password or 2FA (which did temporarily)
AT NOT POINT did someone ask me for a document/challenge/manager name to verify who I was.
Just being myself, knowing a couple pieces of info that were easily searchable on LinkedIn and I was in.
Scary stuff and a reminder that ALL of these systems are a lot easier to break into than many of us realize.
They complain about endless red tape right now, when they barely have to send a properly formatted letter to a company to receive tons of personal data
I think we need a law that government agencies must support out of band identity proofing.
The root of the problem is that government agencies can request personal details and if the tech company fails to comply then the tech company is sanctioned. However the government agency forces the tech company to provide details in an insecure way often over email. If the tech company tries to demand reasonable security then the law enforcement agency views this as non-compliance and starts the sanctions.
Somewhat pointless given that for most of these companies this would have to be an international effort. Google will hand over your info if the "authorities" from Azerbaijan request it.
If we would have a way how to tell that request for data is coming from investigation and this request should be signed by a judge. Like a search warrant against an affidavit and tell cops to get lost until they will produce it?
Why this kind of thing doesn't require a judge to confirm the demand? And the judgement published publicly? (Or at least, on a government website that have specific access for TelCo/bigCo to read them)?
> But officers can also make emergency data requests, or EDRs, in cases involving a threat of imminent harm or death. These requests typically bypass any additional verification steps by the companies who are under pressure to fulfill the request as quickly as possible.
How do companies decide which EDRs to fulfill and which ones require a judicial subpoena? Are companies ever even under the obligation to fulfill an EDR?
> So in a lot of the searches that we reviewed, we had about 500,000 to take a look at. We found the word “investigation” – or variations of the word “investigation” – or “suspect” a lot with really no details about what the investigation pertained to or what the suspect may have done.
> A lot of searches also just listed gibberish, like “ASDF” – that’s the sequence of letters in the center row of your computer keyboard. Or just said that they were there for random checks. We even found a search that just said “donut” or that didn’t say anything at all.
It's always the ISP. It has always been the ISP.
The old hot thing was very similar. This no longer works and likely hasn't since 2016ish. But it was rampant starting in 2009.
You'd connect to a live chat (or phone call) and tell the customer support rep that it's your first day on the job and the man training you has a thick accent, making it very difficult to understand him. You then ask a hypothetical, e.g "If someone phones in asking for help with regaining access to their account, or setting up security questions, what tool do I open up?". You'd then get more specific with the hypotheticals, gradually. The only thing you cared about were the name of the tool and the steps to pull up an account by IP address. At the time, almost all ISPs had their own software suite. Verizon used something related to Coffee. I think it was just called Coffee tbh. Anyway, the goal is to get them to tell you both the name of the internal tool they use + the rough steps on how to pull up an account. Most of the time, via phone and sheer confidence, you would get the information you needed within two to three attempts. You could also take it a step further if you were bored and try to get screenshots from the rep of the software.
Edit: You'd also ask the rep for their employee identification number, if applicable. You'd then use that if you need to hard-sell it in the next call. It really didn't matter if the ID was valid, so long as it was the correct length/format. Yes, they would really just tell you. I do not know why.
After you had that information, you'd phone back, making sure you got separate rep. Depending on size of ISP, you may have had to call back after a shift change.
You inform them your regional servers are down and you're unable to connect. You could flush this out more if you had additional information on the ISPs tech. You then would go on to say "I have a customer on the line who's rightfully upset after their account was apparently accessed without authorization. The customer is saying they changed the PII on the account and they're unable to recover it." This gives you a shitty, but somewhat valid-ish excuse to pull the account up by IP. You'd then use the information attained from the first step to sell that you are indeed an employee. Name of the tool, input labels (roughly), steps needed, button names, etc. If the rep is remotely technical, hang up, try again. You'd then confirm the information on the account with the rep. It helped if you had some information about the person already, e.g first name or rough location.
Comcast was the worst offender. Charter second. Verizon was a bit more tough, but not by much. People started doing this as a first-step in targeted identity fraud, which got a lot more attention on it. Along with all the typical information (street address, postal code, state) you'd also almost always be able to get the last four of the social on the account + last 4 of any card on auto-pay.
If you're worried about this sort of thing, the best advice I can give you is to check with your ISP and see if they allow a verbal password that can be tied to your account. Anyone calling in for support or connecting to live chat would need to provide it before the account's accessed.
I'm not sure how relevant swatting is nowadays, but if you're at all in a position where you have concerns over it happening, it would be wise to phone your local police department and let them know there's a possibility this might happen. From what I remember, most of the time they ask for your cell number. In the event that this does happen, they will still send the full swat team to your residence. But they will phone your cell and ask you to come out prior to kicking down the door.
Source: was bored in when I was 15/16 and doxxed pedophiles.
This brings me back, I had this happen to me on comcast back in ~2014 - reset the master key on the account and attacker gained access into all my parents emails as well since they were also via comcast. I’ll never forget waking up to that one! Always wondered what SE happened behind the scenes to make it happen - thanks for sharing.
> “This was an email address that looked like the real thing,” says Exempt, explaining the mechanics of how he tricked Charter Communications. “The real domain of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in Florida is jaxsheriff.org. We purchased jaxsheriff.us and then spoofed our number as the department’s, so that when we called them to verify receipt of the legal process, when they searched the number, it would come back to the sheriff’s office, giving them no reason to doubt it. We use real badge numbers and officer names as well.”
I'm honestly impressed. It's an interesting situation where the companies can only verify the same information that the hackers have access to
"No problem, Deputy Smith. I'll call you back at your listed number now to complete your request."
What am I missing? Not doing this is negligent. Same advice we'd give to phishing targets.
Their listed number on jaxsheriff.us? What if they bought Google ads to get the first result for Jacksonville Office?
> The real domain of the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in Florida is jaxsheriff.org. We purchased jaxsheriff.us
This would not be an issue if RFC 1480 had been taken seriously.
Too many edge cases, some would still be exploitable. Eg if the real address was:
Malicious actors could register: Unless your solution is to add some verification step as part of .us registrations.Can people register a subdomain of fl.us willy-nilly though? Isn't the root domain owned by the state?
From the RFC (note the "or businesses"):
So you'd be counting on the sub-registrar of jacksonville.fl.us not to allow a registration for the fraudulent "business" of Sheriff, Inc. -- multiplied by every municipality across the country.Many top-level TLDs have requirements you need to fulfill, .edu is a good example. Similarly you need to prove you're a local entity for many country-specific TLDs. At the end of the day though, this attack vector will always be there, no matter how diligent you are about it. Phishing is all about numbers and one in is often all you need.
Wouldn't make any difference, you'd just hack one email at any random sheriff department in the country. Or pay $5 for one, anyway.
I used to watch videos from social engineers like Jayson Street [0] and think "Is it really that easy to break into serious firms with social engineering?" and then the below happened:
- COVID lock down and I can't access my internal PC from home
- Call help desk line and say "hi, it's <ME> and I can't login. Btw, there is another person at the firm named <ME> (which was true) but that's not me HA HA."
- Help Desk removes 2FA
- Still doesn't work so I call back and reference the first call.
- Help Desk removes IP restriction
- This keeps happening (can't login, Help Desk removes something) until basically I can login with no password or 2FA (which did temporarily)
AT NOT POINT did someone ask me for a document/challenge/manager name to verify who I was.
Just being myself, knowing a couple pieces of info that were easily searchable on LinkedIn and I was in.
Scary stuff and a reminder that ALL of these systems are a lot easier to break into than many of us realize.
0 - https://jaysonestreet.com/media.php
This same kind of hack was mentioned in Mr. Robot nine years ago and it isn't fixed. https://www.theverge.com/2016/9/7/12835320/mr-robot-hack-rep... (Back then it was fax-based.) I'm not surprised but I am annoyed that we can't fix this.
Police will complain about "endless pointless red tape" if it's fixed.
They complain about endless red tape right now, when they barely have to send a properly formatted letter to a company to receive tons of personal data
Maybe some verification upfront would save a lot of red tape later.
That requires long term thinking. Which nobody does anymore.
I think we need a law that government agencies must support out of band identity proofing.
The root of the problem is that government agencies can request personal details and if the tech company fails to comply then the tech company is sanctioned. However the government agency forces the tech company to provide details in an insecure way often over email. If the tech company tries to demand reasonable security then the law enforcement agency views this as non-compliance and starts the sanctions.
That would first require a reduction in institutional law enforcement hypocrisy that is culturally-incompatible with "rules for thee, but not for me."
Somewhat pointless given that for most of these companies this would have to be an international effort. Google will hand over your info if the "authorities" from Azerbaijan request it.
If we would have a way how to tell that request for data is coming from investigation and this request should be signed by a judge. Like a search warrant against an affidavit and tell cops to get lost until they will produce it?
For everyone else who's getting "You’ve read your last free article" like me:
https://archive.is/RltXf
Cops posing as subpoenas are tricking the 4th amendment into barely existing
Why this kind of thing doesn't require a judge to confirm the demand? And the judgement published publicly? (Or at least, on a government website that have specific access for TelCo/bigCo to read them)?
> But officers can also make emergency data requests, or EDRs, in cases involving a threat of imminent harm or death. These requests typically bypass any additional verification steps by the companies who are under pressure to fulfill the request as quickly as possible.
How do companies decide which EDRs to fulfill and which ones require a judicial subpoena? Are companies ever even under the obligation to fulfill an EDR?
Maybe they type ASDF or donut:
https://www.texasstandard.org/stories/flock-safety-cameras-h...
> So in a lot of the searches that we reviewed, we had about 500,000 to take a look at. We found the word “investigation” – or variations of the word “investigation” – or “suspect” a lot with really no details about what the investigation pertained to or what the suspect may have done.
> A lot of searches also just listed gibberish, like “ASDF” – that’s the sequence of letters in the center row of your computer keyboard. Or just said that they were there for random checks. We even found a search that just said “donut” or that didn’t say anything at all.
One day all your clouds will be made public.
Art of deception in full effect here. Kevin Mitnick would be proud.
It's always the ISP. It has always been the ISP. The old hot thing was very similar. This no longer works and likely hasn't since 2016ish. But it was rampant starting in 2009.
You'd connect to a live chat (or phone call) and tell the customer support rep that it's your first day on the job and the man training you has a thick accent, making it very difficult to understand him. You then ask a hypothetical, e.g "If someone phones in asking for help with regaining access to their account, or setting up security questions, what tool do I open up?". You'd then get more specific with the hypotheticals, gradually. The only thing you cared about were the name of the tool and the steps to pull up an account by IP address. At the time, almost all ISPs had their own software suite. Verizon used something related to Coffee. I think it was just called Coffee tbh. Anyway, the goal is to get them to tell you both the name of the internal tool they use + the rough steps on how to pull up an account. Most of the time, via phone and sheer confidence, you would get the information you needed within two to three attempts. You could also take it a step further if you were bored and try to get screenshots from the rep of the software.
Edit: You'd also ask the rep for their employee identification number, if applicable. You'd then use that if you need to hard-sell it in the next call. It really didn't matter if the ID was valid, so long as it was the correct length/format. Yes, they would really just tell you. I do not know why.
After you had that information, you'd phone back, making sure you got separate rep. Depending on size of ISP, you may have had to call back after a shift change.
You inform them your regional servers are down and you're unable to connect. You could flush this out more if you had additional information on the ISPs tech. You then would go on to say "I have a customer on the line who's rightfully upset after their account was apparently accessed without authorization. The customer is saying they changed the PII on the account and they're unable to recover it." This gives you a shitty, but somewhat valid-ish excuse to pull the account up by IP. You'd then use the information attained from the first step to sell that you are indeed an employee. Name of the tool, input labels (roughly), steps needed, button names, etc. If the rep is remotely technical, hang up, try again. You'd then confirm the information on the account with the rep. It helped if you had some information about the person already, e.g first name or rough location.
Comcast was the worst offender. Charter second. Verizon was a bit more tough, but not by much. People started doing this as a first-step in targeted identity fraud, which got a lot more attention on it. Along with all the typical information (street address, postal code, state) you'd also almost always be able to get the last four of the social on the account + last 4 of any card on auto-pay.
If you're worried about this sort of thing, the best advice I can give you is to check with your ISP and see if they allow a verbal password that can be tied to your account. Anyone calling in for support or connecting to live chat would need to provide it before the account's accessed.
I'm not sure how relevant swatting is nowadays, but if you're at all in a position where you have concerns over it happening, it would be wise to phone your local police department and let them know there's a possibility this might happen. From what I remember, most of the time they ask for your cell number. In the event that this does happen, they will still send the full swat team to your residence. But they will phone your cell and ask you to come out prior to kicking down the door.
Source: was bored in when I was 15/16 and doxxed pedophiles.
The Verizon software is CoFEE, AT&T had Clarify and SystemX, Cox had Polaris, Charter had Sigma, Comcast had Grandslam, TWC/RR had Real and Unify
Netflix had Obiwan, Amazon had CRC.
Sometime well over a decade ago I used to have teamviewer on all of these :)
Haha, I remember taking what I learned from doing this and trying to apply it to everything I could think of.
In my head, I miss those days. But I don't miss lacking a moral compass. I think I miss the feeling of fewer online barriers existing.
This brings me back, I had this happen to me on comcast back in ~2014 - reset the master key on the account and attacker gained access into all my parents emails as well since they were also via comcast. I’ll never forget waking up to that one! Always wondered what SE happened behind the scenes to make it happen - thanks for sharing.
[flagged]
Why pretend when they are still hiring?
[flagged]