> The US is a major oil and has producer. It's benefiting from this war of aggression and not even taking any damage.
Oil companies are benefiting, everything else in the US suffers. Money isn't going to trickle out of these oil companies to spur economic activity.
Nations that benefit from the war do so because of nationalized oil production. Any nation without that is going to ultimately suffer because that added oil revenue doesn't make it's way back to the public.
All nations are going to look at increased food costs and potentially even shortages next year due to increased fertilizer and transport costs.
It's not that simple. Production costs have gone up for everyone, inflation is going to get worse so the simple logic of "higher prices, higher profits" doesn't really work in this case.
There will be a short term long term thing with this. I agree with you that ultimately everyone loses long term. Short term the higher prices will result in higher profits which will enrich whoever owns the oil.
We aren't at the end of the inflation, though, that's going to hit. This is only the beginning. Next year will be when things really go south. At this point it's not a question of if, but rather how bad.
Pretty sure the big losers are US missile intercept systems manufactures since they've basically been outed as useless so I'm not sure who would want to buy them now. And Israel, of course, who is getting struck as a result of their over reliance on these systems. US bases are being wrecked, all the radar systems are gone, several carriers damaged - not sure that is no damage.
The US consumer will still pay more at the petrol station. Doesn't matter to them that some big oil companies are making a killing somewhere else in the US. US consumers vote.
> The big loser in this war is Europe and other roil importing nations.
> The US is a major oil and has producer.
US citizens are loosers as well since cost of oil increased for them as well. This will also have inflation impact on other products from them as well on top of previous tariffs.
Crude oil isn't as commoditized as LNG. Europe refineries (at least France, but probably most of Western Europe) are made to refine oil from Africa and the north sea, and wouldn't know what to do with ME oil anyway. Algeria or Libya can't suddenly sell their crude to asia or the US, because the refineries able to transform it are in europe. This will hit european countries that depends on LNG, but the impact on crude oil price in both the Texas index and the north sea index will be felt way less than in Asia.
If you are talking about the refined product: it will hurt everyone the same, except the executives from big oil, and again, not that sure, because increased transportation/transformation costs decrease productivity, and we can enter a credit crunch that will harm debt-fueled economies pretty hard..
I like your optimism. But I don't see the plan. The short-term impact is going to be nasty–regardless of trend, Europe depends on imported oil and gas. The same Europe that is currently financing an expensive military buildup.
The answer is to strike a deal with China. Unfortunately, that requires compromising on some values.
> countries that actively resisted diversifying their energy mix
Rhetoric aside, America continues to add renewable capacity [1].
> only reasonable reaction is a Metternichian rebalancing of powers
It's rational, but it comes at costs. (And with costs.) China would have to put a stop to Putin's revanchism. Otherwise, Europe is just financing its burial and subjugation. And the EU would have to sign off on China's human-right records, and, in all likelihood, Taiwan policy. That, in turn, sets up a clash with the rest of Asia.
China is cutting two deals, one with themselves, and another with everybody else. They have one overriding rule which applys internaly and externaly, dont mess with the brand, ever ,or it will cost you more than you can pay.
Also if you dig into things you will find that China has certain trade practises that they have been in place for 3000 years without a pause, and therein lies the only "deal" they will make.
Another also is the recognition by China of modern Iran, bieng another
"elder civilisation" that they have comonalities with but never had issue with.
I was extremely surprised by this figure, so I checked the article and it's not "Renewables already surpass fossil fuel in the energy mix" but "Renewables already surpass fossil fuel in the electricity production" right? This is a massive difference. According to Wikipedia, fossil fuels were about 75% of the energy mix in the UK (to take on example) as late as 2024.
> as if the US president was primarily pursuing Russian interests
Comforting to imagine someone is in charge. But given the President's inability to even pursue his own interests coherently, I'm going with Putin got lucky on this dice roll.
And statistically speaking, we may have achieved it. At least since 1950, possibly since the Industrial Revolution, speculatively for millenia, war has become less lethal [1].
After WWII, I believe it was one of the most peaceful times in human history. For one thing, the post-war order - the UN, EU, international law, etc. - effectively stopped international war (with a few exceptions).
> 21st century
Even more peaceful, though the prohibition against international war has been violated with the intent of returning to the pre-WWII world.
This war has been one of the best things to happen to the IRGC.
Oil prices went up, sanctions got lifted, citizens are now united with the goals of the government, dissidents are silenced, the world hates that the US and Israel did this and blames them directly. Really, there's almost no goal of the IRGC that Trump didn't just speed run by starting a war.
And this was all for what? The US has yet to articulate an actual reason they did any of this other than "Israel was going to do it, so we went along with them". All the politicians in support of this war flounder and have to rely on "Well, they hate us" as justification for why we are killing school girls and attacking Iran's power grids and desalination plants.
I'm not a fan of the IRGC, but this really was the absolute worst way to address them.
> war has been one of the best things to happen to the IRGC
This is hyperbole. If Iran could veto the war at the start, they would have. They're coming out of it, right now, relatively better off than the U.S. was when we started inasmuch as we have achieved zero strategic priorities and they've survived while adding a revenue source. But they've also lost massive amounts of military and industrial investment, to say nothing of decades of leadership.
> If Iran could veto the war at the start, they would have.
Sure, because nobody likes the unknown prospect of dying or knowing exactly how far this war will ultimately go. However, this has all made the IRGC a lot stronger and has given them a lot more power.
> But they've also lost massive amounts of military and industrial investment
Investment made for exactly the purpose it's being used. They are also massively depleting the US and Israel's munitions. The math is really bad. The missiles and drones are pretty cheap and quick for Iran to manufacture and they've spent decades setting that up because of this very scenario. Meanwhile, the US hasn't had to exercise it's supplies and we already see they are running low as more and more explosives appear to be making their way through the Iron Dome. But also, the massive amount of damage that's been to US bases throughout the region.
> to say nothing of decades of leadership.
Iran's leadership doesn't work like a lot of other nations. The big mistake Trump made was assuming taking out the supreme leader was all it'd take for them to crumble. The government is a lot more complex and not fully invested in one powerful man. And it's this way exactly because of the threat of attack by the US.
This is why after both the US and Israel got to the point where they couldn't figure out who was running Iran, Iran was still continuing attacks on US bases and Israel.
Much like the US government and military, there's not a single politician or general you could take out that would cause a collapse in command. Unlike the US government, they have a very large government body that can pick and choose new leaders pretty quickly. It took them, what, 2 weeks to pick the next supreme leader?
I'm sure Iran didn't want this war, but I'm also sure the IRGC has reaped massive amounts of benefits because of it.
These are all very predictable results and the reason no president has been dumb enough to directly attack Iran. It's been reported that generals were advising against this attack. But even people without US intelligence could have predicted these outcomes.
> this has all made the IRGC a lot stronger and has given them a lot more power
It's consolidated their rule over a weaker state. Whether that counts as "stronger" and "more power" depends on scoping.
> Investment made for exactly the purpose it's being used
I strongly doubt Iran built a navy so it could be potted in harbor. Same for their launchers, many of which got off a handful of shots at most.
> They are also massively depleting the US and Israel's munitions
Sort of. On the other side, we're seeing a defense-industrial renaissance in the U.S. and Israel, including around cheaper anti-drone defenses [1].
> the massive amount of damage that's been to US bases throughout the region
Massive is hyperbole. Expensive, difficult-to-make equipment has been destroyed. (In large part because we refuse to pay for base hardening.) The worst hit, however, remains more operational than the least-hit Iranian facilities.
> government is a lot more complex and not fully invested in one powerful man
Correct. But the people at the top weren't numpties. Losing talent is losing talent. It doesn't capitulate a well-built system. But it does degrade it. (These are, however, long-term costs.)
> I'm also sure the IRGC has reaped massive amounts of benefits because of it
Perhaps. We won't be able to say definitively until after the dust settles. We've been targeting IRGC heavy equipment and industry, specifically, which means their wealth may have plummeted precipitously, even if they've consolidated power.
> Perhaps. We won't be able to say definitively until after the dust settles. We've been targeting IRGC heavy equipment and industry, specifically, which means their wealth may have plummeted precipitously, even if they've consolidated power.
Well, I do agree. But I also think that to get to the point where the IRGC doesn't ultimately benefit will mean a very large amount of bloodshed and investment. And by that, I mean the equivalent of dropping nukes on Tehran worth of damage. Ultimately anything short of that will give them a lot of opportunity to rebuild.
I don't think the US can topple them simply be continually bombing. They'd need a pretty massive amount of ground troops deployed or inhumane destruction.
I guess I still hold out hope that Trump pulls out before we get to either point.
If it does go to either point, the world will be royally screwed in terms of oil. Iran isn't going to go down without a massive amount of destruction of oil production throughout the region which is going to wreck the world.
> by that, I mean the equivalent of dropping nukes on Tehran worth of damage
As I've argued, I think we've already left the IRGC weaker–if more consolidated–than it was a few months ago. But levelling it further would just require what Trump has said he wants to do: destroy the local power and water infrastructure.
I don't think that destroys the IRGC, it destroys the civilian population.
They might be weaker in the sense that they'll have less soldiers, but as far as a government goes, it will empower them like we've never seen. It will cement their power as the entire population is going to completely support them.
Much like how Hamas still exists even though Gaza has been leveled.
On the other hand, they managed their regime change from a theocracy by the Mollah to a weird monarchy by the IRGC and the Khomenei clan with no Shi'a backlash. The MEK is weaker than ever despite a resurgence in the last few years, the Baloch/Sistani rebellion is petering out (let's say the Iranian Eastern clans are _very_ wary of the US after being abandoned 3 time, and the general population have a very heavy dislike of the US after the Afghanistan war).
The only remaining dangerous uprising left are the Kurds that the IRGC managed to strike down while saying "this is a strike against the US interest", and they will probably get help from the Iraki Shi'a paramilitaries to put some pressure.
Honestly, i know it isn't the case, but if you told me an exceptionally competent cabal organized that war to prevent Iran from collapsing: thee regime killed 7-15k in january (or rather, 6-14, around ~1k was regime forces getting killed), but the real information was the number of arrest: 40k, and more than 10k jailed They can now kill their jailed political opponent in secret, because you know, war time. US fuckers couldn't just wait Khomenei's death. he was in phase 4, and his cancer seemed pretty quick ffs.
This piece includes original reporting sourced from maritime intelligence firms, financial forensics by Kharon, and an anonymous source with knowledge of Iran's oil accounting. What specifically do you think they got wrong? Happy to look at a better source if you have one.
What they got wrong is the title. The premise is bad, to start.
Iran could have leveraged these defensive tactics to make "a mint" from oil exports at any time. The war, for the state that it is in, is not where they are making the money. They have lost money as a consequence of the war and made money from tightening export controls to the point there are physical barriers. The forensic accounting is incidental and well understood from other nations (eg Russia, NK, etc).
The concluding paragraph that might tie these rather boring descriptions of economic machination together, is barely coherent. Read it carefully.
> The extreme redundancy introduces such complexity that the money is getting harder to trace even for Iran’s central bank—and easier for the country’s oil barons to skim. But it keeps the oil machine going. Short of all-out strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure—to which Iran would respond by bombing that of other Gulf states—it will not be throttled.
Both sentences are baseless indictments, at best. First aimed at oil producers who are "skimming", which they are not. The second run-on is gaslighting Iran as a state, as hell-bent on bombing unnamed neighbors in "the gulf" which seems purposefully chosen as ambiguous.
Is stating facts about the minutia of circumventing sanctions, then demonizing the actors, considered journalism? I don't think so.
> What they got wrong is the title. The premise is bad, to start.
Admittedly, the title is somewhat misleading. It doesn't take into account the massive costs Iran is absorbing in destroyed infrastructure, steel production offline, millions displaced, economy in freefall.
> Iran could have leveraged these defensive tactics to make "a mint" from oil exports at any time. The war, for the state that it is in, is not where they are making the money. They have lost money as a consequence of the war and made money from tightening export controls to the point there are physical barriers. The forensic accounting is incidental and well understood from other nations (eg Russia, NK, etc).
This is incorrect. The Strait of Hormuz blockade is a wartime measure. Iran couldn't have blockaded Hormuz in peacetime without triggering the kind of military response it's now already absorbing. The war is what made the blockade possible as a strategy. Iran had nothing left to lose by escalating. The pre war discount was $18–24/barrel. It's now $7–12. That improvement is directly war driven.
> Both sentences are baseless indictments, at best. First aimed at oil producers who are "skimming", which they are not.
The Economist isn't making a moral indictment as much as it's describing a consequence of routing payments through thousands of shell accounts across multiple jurisdictions.
> The second run-on is gaslighting Iran as a state, as hell-bent on bombing unnamed neighbors in "the gulf" which seems purposefully chosen as ambiguous.
Iran has explicitly threatened retaliatory strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure. This isn't speculation or gaslighting, it's stated Iranian deterrence. The article is describing the strategic calculus that makes all out infrastructure strikes unlikely.
> is stating facts then demonizing actors journalism?
You are recharacterizing conclusions drawn from reported facts as demonization, which lets you dismiss any reporting that reaches an unflattering conclusion about any actor.
Which specific factual claim in the article do you think is wrong?
> The Strait of Hormuz blockade is a wartime measure. Iran couldn't have blockaded Hormuz in peacetime without triggering the kind of military response it's now already absorbing.
So they could have, for the reasons you have pointed out. It's not "because of the war" but it is a consequence for someone to do something they could have done and "triggered the kind of military response it's now already absorbing." - you and I have a very different idea of what reality is.
> The Economist isn't making a moral indictment as much as it's describing a consequence of routing payments through thousands of shell accounts across multiple jurisdictions.
Please don't do that. None of the last paragraph is about consequence of routing payments.
I have pointed out how the facts are a facade for demonization. I stand by it.
Journalism is a narrative about recent history. Treating the facts and opinions as equal parts, is soft propaganda. This is how Fox News started and what it seems The Economist engages in enough, to point it out. You may or may not agree with the messaging, but the admission of leaning into it is not laudable.
It's a bit absurd to describe all the procedures Iran takes to disguise those ships. It's not like it is hard for the US military to track massive tankers in a small sea (or to intercept them if they wish to). Those tankers are tolerated by the US because they don't want to antagonise China more than they need right now (not the least to keep them out of this conflict), and don't want to add more pressure on the oil market. Not because somehow those ships evaded US vigilance thanks to Iran's cunning skills.
But this is a damocles sword hanging over Iran. The US could seize those tankers if they want to apply more pressure.
And by doing so escalate more and potentially lead Iran to hit critical infra across the gulf nations and potentially disrupt red sea shipping too. There is too much exposed, expensive and delicate infrastructure to adequately protect. Iran could likely cause far more damage than it already has, and to infrastructure that could lead to years, or even decades, of problems all at a time when oil is starting to wind down. The gulf nations know this. This could transition oil earlier than expected. Hit their oil infra, and their water infra and the region may not recover until oil is no longer in demand. Nations are likely taking notice of how cavalier the US is being with other nations security and prosperity right now. Spain is getting down right hostile and we have a lot of military assets there and along history of joint bases with them. This is potentially a major turning point for supporting the US in any endeavor. Basically, yeah, I am sure we know where those ships are but hopefully we are being as rational as possible somewhere in the government and are holding back in hopes of -something- being salvaged here.
> by doing so escalate more and potentially lead Iran to hit critical infra across the gulf nations and potentially disrupt red sea shipping
Nothing indicates the U.S. is taking Iran's threats of escalation seriously. Like, I think we should. But it doesn't seem to be playing into the calculus. If Iran escalates, the U.S. can too. And I don't think Trump is bluffing about hitting power and water infrastructure.
The reason we aren't hitting the ships is because we want oil to keep flowing into the international markets.
In the past it had less to do with seizing the vessels and more to do with keeping financial flows between organizations offering shipping services and oil hidden from the banking system. America could have easily seized any ship they wanted to during the sanctions over the past decade. They didnt because the sanctions are American constructs: they dont apply on the open seas where UNCLOS matters. America can still seize them, but the legality is murky and comes with a reputational cost.
Now with Hormuz closed, America needs every last oil barrel moving so the economy doesn’t grind to a halt. Remember, it’s a war of choice for the US. We don’t need Iran gone as much as we want low oil prices.
> the sanctions are American constructs: they dont apply on the open seas where UNCLOS matters
Technically correct. But the way these countries evade U.S. sanctions is by flying false or no flag. That, in turn, makes them vulnerable under UNCLOS's anti-piracy rules.
Curious, at what price per barrel does US oil fields get profitable? For their own domestic consumption they don't really need the Irani oil do they ? It seems to be the case that it's rest of the world that needs the oil and US needs the rest of the world to not be pissed at the US.
> at what price per barrel does US oil fields get profitable?
$30 to 70 per barrel [1]. (Pretty much all production is profitable above $100/barrel.)
> they don't really need the Irani oil do they ?
Our refineries can't process our own crude. So we export crude and import refined products.
That said, yes, the oil exports do blunt the net effect of the blow. If pressure really rose, one could tax the excess profits to directly reduce gas prices.
Agree it's a thin disguise. It works because the same sword hangs over Trump's head as well. He needs the price of oil to not spike too high so any oil supply is welcome.
And for all the heated rethoric, both sides have shown a certain restraint so far, which is encouraging. It doesn't feel like a deal is out of the question.
The big loser in this war is Europe and other roil importing nations.
The US is a major oil and has producer. It's benefiting from this war of aggression and not even taking any damage.
Oil companies and arms manufacturers are having a bonanza.
After the violence wracked 20th century I was hopeful the 21st century would be a bit more enlightened ...
> The US is a major oil and has producer. It's benefiting from this war of aggression and not even taking any damage.
Oil companies are benefiting, everything else in the US suffers. Money isn't going to trickle out of these oil companies to spur economic activity.
Nations that benefit from the war do so because of nationalized oil production. Any nation without that is going to ultimately suffer because that added oil revenue doesn't make it's way back to the public.
All nations are going to look at increased food costs and potentially even shortages next year due to increased fertilizer and transport costs.
It's not that simple. Production costs have gone up for everyone, inflation is going to get worse so the simple logic of "higher prices, higher profits" doesn't really work in this case.
There will be a short term long term thing with this. I agree with you that ultimately everyone loses long term. Short term the higher prices will result in higher profits which will enrich whoever owns the oil.
We aren't at the end of the inflation, though, that's going to hit. This is only the beginning. Next year will be when things really go south. At this point it's not a question of if, but rather how bad.
I agree.
Pretty sure the big losers are US missile intercept systems manufactures since they've basically been outed as useless so I'm not sure who would want to buy them now. And Israel, of course, who is getting struck as a result of their over reliance on these systems. US bases are being wrecked, all the radar systems are gone, several carriers damaged - not sure that is no damage.
The US consumer will still pay more at the petrol station. Doesn't matter to them that some big oil companies are making a killing somewhere else in the US. US consumers vote.
Hey, everyone benefits from the rise in GDP per capita due to oil companies and MIC making a killing. /s
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> The big loser in this war is Europe and other roil importing nations. > The US is a major oil and has producer.
US citizens are loosers as well since cost of oil increased for them as well. This will also have inflation impact on other products from them as well on top of previous tariffs.
It's "losers"
Crude oil isn't as commoditized as LNG. Europe refineries (at least France, but probably most of Western Europe) are made to refine oil from Africa and the north sea, and wouldn't know what to do with ME oil anyway. Algeria or Libya can't suddenly sell their crude to asia or the US, because the refineries able to transform it are in europe. This will hit european countries that depends on LNG, but the impact on crude oil price in both the Texas index and the north sea index will be felt way less than in Asia.
If you are talking about the refined product: it will hurt everyone the same, except the executives from big oil, and again, not that sure, because increased transportation/transformation costs decrease productivity, and we can enter a credit crunch that will harm debt-fueled economies pretty hard..
Longer term Europe is positioned to come out of this looking pretty good.
Renewables already surpass fossil fuel in the energy mix [0], this will only accelerate the shift to energy independence.
It's countries that actively resisted diversifying their energy mix like the US that will feel the long term pain.
[0] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2026/jan/22/wind-and...
I like your optimism. But I don't see the plan. The short-term impact is going to be nasty–regardless of trend, Europe depends on imported oil and gas. The same Europe that is currently financing an expensive military buildup.
The answer is to strike a deal with China. Unfortunately, that requires compromising on some values.
> countries that actively resisted diversifying their energy mix
Rhetoric aside, America continues to add renewable capacity [1].
[1] https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=67367
I have long been advocating striking a deal with China.
The US has been trying to sell out Europe to Russians in a misguided quest to win them over against the Chinese.
The only reasonable reaction is a Metternichian rebalancing of powers.
> only reasonable reaction is a Metternichian rebalancing of powers
It's rational, but it comes at costs. (And with costs.) China would have to put a stop to Putin's revanchism. Otherwise, Europe is just financing its burial and subjugation. And the EU would have to sign off on China's human-right records, and, in all likelihood, Taiwan policy. That, in turn, sets up a clash with the rest of Asia.
That is pretty much my opinion as well.
China is cutting two deals, one with themselves, and another with everybody else. They have one overriding rule which applys internaly and externaly, dont mess with the brand, ever ,or it will cost you more than you can pay. Also if you dig into things you will find that China has certain trade practises that they have been in place for 3000 years without a pause, and therein lies the only "deal" they will make. Another also is the recognition by China of modern Iran, bieng another "elder civilisation" that they have comonalities with but never had issue with.
I was extremely surprised by this figure, so I checked the article and it's not "Renewables already surpass fossil fuel in the energy mix" but "Renewables already surpass fossil fuel in the electricity production" right? This is a massive difference. According to Wikipedia, fossil fuels were about 75% of the energy mix in the UK (to take on example) as late as 2024.
> Europe and other roil importing nations
Europe and Asia have been royally screwed by this war. Ironically, the winners are Russia, in absolute terms, and China, relative to its neighbors.
Almost as if the US president was primarily pursuing Russian interests...
> as if the US president was primarily pursuing Russian interests
Comforting to imagine someone is in charge. But given the President's inability to even pursue his own interests coherently, I'm going with Putin got lucky on this dice roll.
> Ironically, the winners are Russia
Where's the irony if that was the plan?
US oil producers will win yes, because the prices are going up and they can provide. But the US consumers will feel it badly.
The big loser is Asia. Heavily dependent on oil going through Hormuz.
> After the violence wracked 20th century I was hopeful the 21st century would be a bit more enlightened
People hope for that every century.
> People hope for that every century
And statistically speaking, we may have achieved it. At least since 1950, possibly since the Industrial Revolution, speculatively for millenia, war has become less lethal [1].
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Better_Angels_of_Our_Natur...
Time to get off if oil, like yesterday.
> violence wracked 20th century
After WWII, I believe it was one of the most peaceful times in human history. For one thing, the post-war order - the UN, EU, international law, etc. - effectively stopped international war (with a few exceptions).
> 21st century
Even more peaceful, though the prohibition against international war has been violated with the intent of returning to the pre-WWII world.
"Enlightenment" is for civilizations with enough might to enforce it.
> After the violence wracked 20th century I was hopeful the 21st century would be a bit more enlightened
The Trump presidency feels like the dying tremors of imperialist, oligarchic, patriarchal IXX century leadership that resists to disappear.
Like the other two septuagenarian boomer leaders blowing up shit across of the world - Putin and Bibi
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https://archive.is/IRnul
This war has been one of the best things to happen to the IRGC.
Oil prices went up, sanctions got lifted, citizens are now united with the goals of the government, dissidents are silenced, the world hates that the US and Israel did this and blames them directly. Really, there's almost no goal of the IRGC that Trump didn't just speed run by starting a war.
And this was all for what? The US has yet to articulate an actual reason they did any of this other than "Israel was going to do it, so we went along with them". All the politicians in support of this war flounder and have to rely on "Well, they hate us" as justification for why we are killing school girls and attacking Iran's power grids and desalination plants.
I'm not a fan of the IRGC, but this really was the absolute worst way to address them.
> war has been one of the best things to happen to the IRGC
This is hyperbole. If Iran could veto the war at the start, they would have. They're coming out of it, right now, relatively better off than the U.S. was when we started inasmuch as we have achieved zero strategic priorities and they've survived while adding a revenue source. But they've also lost massive amounts of military and industrial investment, to say nothing of decades of leadership.
> If Iran could veto the war at the start, they would have.
Sure, because nobody likes the unknown prospect of dying or knowing exactly how far this war will ultimately go. However, this has all made the IRGC a lot stronger and has given them a lot more power.
> But they've also lost massive amounts of military and industrial investment
Investment made for exactly the purpose it's being used. They are also massively depleting the US and Israel's munitions. The math is really bad. The missiles and drones are pretty cheap and quick for Iran to manufacture and they've spent decades setting that up because of this very scenario. Meanwhile, the US hasn't had to exercise it's supplies and we already see they are running low as more and more explosives appear to be making their way through the Iron Dome. But also, the massive amount of damage that's been to US bases throughout the region.
> to say nothing of decades of leadership.
Iran's leadership doesn't work like a lot of other nations. The big mistake Trump made was assuming taking out the supreme leader was all it'd take for them to crumble. The government is a lot more complex and not fully invested in one powerful man. And it's this way exactly because of the threat of attack by the US.
This is why after both the US and Israel got to the point where they couldn't figure out who was running Iran, Iran was still continuing attacks on US bases and Israel.
Much like the US government and military, there's not a single politician or general you could take out that would cause a collapse in command. Unlike the US government, they have a very large government body that can pick and choose new leaders pretty quickly. It took them, what, 2 weeks to pick the next supreme leader?
I'm sure Iran didn't want this war, but I'm also sure the IRGC has reaped massive amounts of benefits because of it.
These are all very predictable results and the reason no president has been dumb enough to directly attack Iran. It's been reported that generals were advising against this attack. But even people without US intelligence could have predicted these outcomes.
> this has all made the IRGC a lot stronger and has given them a lot more power
It's consolidated their rule over a weaker state. Whether that counts as "stronger" and "more power" depends on scoping.
> Investment made for exactly the purpose it's being used
I strongly doubt Iran built a navy so it could be potted in harbor. Same for their launchers, many of which got off a handful of shots at most.
> They are also massively depleting the US and Israel's munitions
Sort of. On the other side, we're seeing a defense-industrial renaissance in the U.S. and Israel, including around cheaper anti-drone defenses [1].
> the massive amount of damage that's been to US bases throughout the region
Massive is hyperbole. Expensive, difficult-to-make equipment has been destroyed. (In large part because we refuse to pay for base hardening.) The worst hit, however, remains more operational than the least-hit Iranian facilities.
> government is a lot more complex and not fully invested in one powerful man
Correct. But the people at the top weren't numpties. Losing talent is losing talent. It doesn't capitulate a well-built system. But it does degrade it. (These are, however, long-term costs.)
> I'm also sure the IRGC has reaped massive amounts of benefits because of it
Perhaps. We won't be able to say definitively until after the dust settles. We've been targeting IRGC heavy equipment and industry, specifically, which means their wealth may have plummeted precipitously, even if they've consolidated power.
[1] https://www.wsj.com/world/america-downs-cheap-drones-with-mi...
> Perhaps. We won't be able to say definitively until after the dust settles. We've been targeting IRGC heavy equipment and industry, specifically, which means their wealth may have plummeted precipitously, even if they've consolidated power.
Well, I do agree. But I also think that to get to the point where the IRGC doesn't ultimately benefit will mean a very large amount of bloodshed and investment. And by that, I mean the equivalent of dropping nukes on Tehran worth of damage. Ultimately anything short of that will give them a lot of opportunity to rebuild.
I don't think the US can topple them simply be continually bombing. They'd need a pretty massive amount of ground troops deployed or inhumane destruction.
I guess I still hold out hope that Trump pulls out before we get to either point.
If it does go to either point, the world will be royally screwed in terms of oil. Iran isn't going to go down without a massive amount of destruction of oil production throughout the region which is going to wreck the world.
> by that, I mean the equivalent of dropping nukes on Tehran worth of damage
As I've argued, I think we've already left the IRGC weaker–if more consolidated–than it was a few months ago. But levelling it further would just require what Trump has said he wants to do: destroy the local power and water infrastructure.
I don't think that destroys the IRGC, it destroys the civilian population.
They might be weaker in the sense that they'll have less soldiers, but as far as a government goes, it will empower them like we've never seen. It will cement their power as the entire population is going to completely support them.
Much like how Hamas still exists even though Gaza has been leveled.
On the other hand, they managed their regime change from a theocracy by the Mollah to a weird monarchy by the IRGC and the Khomenei clan with no Shi'a backlash. The MEK is weaker than ever despite a resurgence in the last few years, the Baloch/Sistani rebellion is petering out (let's say the Iranian Eastern clans are _very_ wary of the US after being abandoned 3 time, and the general population have a very heavy dislike of the US after the Afghanistan war).
The only remaining dangerous uprising left are the Kurds that the IRGC managed to strike down while saying "this is a strike against the US interest", and they will probably get help from the Iraki Shi'a paramilitaries to put some pressure.
Honestly, i know it isn't the case, but if you told me an exceptionally competent cabal organized that war to prevent Iran from collapsing: thee regime killed 7-15k in january (or rather, 6-14, around ~1k was regime forces getting killed), but the real information was the number of arrest: 40k, and more than 10k jailed They can now kill their jailed political opponent in secret, because you know, war time. US fuckers couldn't just wait Khomenei's death. he was in phase 4, and his cancer seemed pretty quick ffs.
> the Khomenei clan with no Shi'a backlash. The MEK is weaker than ever despite a resurgence in the last few years
Could you expand on these? Why would there be Shi'a backlash against the Khomeneis? Who are the MEK?
> The US has yet to articulate an actual reason
Distract from Epstein?
Of course that's the main reason, but they would never admit it.
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The Economist doesn't know the difference between journalism and opinion. Ignore them.
This piece includes original reporting sourced from maritime intelligence firms, financial forensics by Kharon, and an anonymous source with knowledge of Iran's oil accounting. What specifically do you think they got wrong? Happy to look at a better source if you have one.
What they got wrong is the title. The premise is bad, to start.
Iran could have leveraged these defensive tactics to make "a mint" from oil exports at any time. The war, for the state that it is in, is not where they are making the money. They have lost money as a consequence of the war and made money from tightening export controls to the point there are physical barriers. The forensic accounting is incidental and well understood from other nations (eg Russia, NK, etc).
The concluding paragraph that might tie these rather boring descriptions of economic machination together, is barely coherent. Read it carefully.
> The extreme redundancy introduces such complexity that the money is getting harder to trace even for Iran’s central bank—and easier for the country’s oil barons to skim. But it keeps the oil machine going. Short of all-out strikes on Iran’s energy infrastructure—to which Iran would respond by bombing that of other Gulf states—it will not be throttled.
Both sentences are baseless indictments, at best. First aimed at oil producers who are "skimming", which they are not. The second run-on is gaslighting Iran as a state, as hell-bent on bombing unnamed neighbors in "the gulf" which seems purposefully chosen as ambiguous.
Is stating facts about the minutia of circumventing sanctions, then demonizing the actors, considered journalism? I don't think so.
> What they got wrong is the title. The premise is bad, to start.
Admittedly, the title is somewhat misleading. It doesn't take into account the massive costs Iran is absorbing in destroyed infrastructure, steel production offline, millions displaced, economy in freefall.
> Iran could have leveraged these defensive tactics to make "a mint" from oil exports at any time. The war, for the state that it is in, is not where they are making the money. They have lost money as a consequence of the war and made money from tightening export controls to the point there are physical barriers. The forensic accounting is incidental and well understood from other nations (eg Russia, NK, etc).
This is incorrect. The Strait of Hormuz blockade is a wartime measure. Iran couldn't have blockaded Hormuz in peacetime without triggering the kind of military response it's now already absorbing. The war is what made the blockade possible as a strategy. Iran had nothing left to lose by escalating. The pre war discount was $18–24/barrel. It's now $7–12. That improvement is directly war driven.
> Both sentences are baseless indictments, at best. First aimed at oil producers who are "skimming", which they are not.
The Economist isn't making a moral indictment as much as it's describing a consequence of routing payments through thousands of shell accounts across multiple jurisdictions.
> The second run-on is gaslighting Iran as a state, as hell-bent on bombing unnamed neighbors in "the gulf" which seems purposefully chosen as ambiguous.
Iran has explicitly threatened retaliatory strikes on Gulf energy infrastructure. This isn't speculation or gaslighting, it's stated Iranian deterrence. The article is describing the strategic calculus that makes all out infrastructure strikes unlikely.
> is stating facts then demonizing actors journalism?
You are recharacterizing conclusions drawn from reported facts as demonization, which lets you dismiss any reporting that reaches an unflattering conclusion about any actor.
Which specific factual claim in the article do you think is wrong?
> The Strait of Hormuz blockade is a wartime measure. Iran couldn't have blockaded Hormuz in peacetime without triggering the kind of military response it's now already absorbing.
So they could have, for the reasons you have pointed out. It's not "because of the war" but it is a consequence for someone to do something they could have done and "triggered the kind of military response it's now already absorbing." - you and I have a very different idea of what reality is.
> The Economist isn't making a moral indictment as much as it's describing a consequence of routing payments through thousands of shell accounts across multiple jurisdictions.
Please don't do that. None of the last paragraph is about consequence of routing payments.
I have pointed out how the facts are a facade for demonization. I stand by it.
The Economist would argue that a declared opinion is no obstacle to journalistic integrity. Specifically:
>journalism of sometimes radical opinion with a reverence for facts [1]
[1] https://www.economistgroup.com/about-us
Journalism is a narrative about recent history. Treating the facts and opinions as equal parts, is soft propaganda. This is how Fox News started and what it seems The Economist engages in enough, to point it out. You may or may not agree with the messaging, but the admission of leaning into it is not laudable.
It's a bit absurd to describe all the procedures Iran takes to disguise those ships. It's not like it is hard for the US military to track massive tankers in a small sea (or to intercept them if they wish to). Those tankers are tolerated by the US because they don't want to antagonise China more than they need right now (not the least to keep them out of this conflict), and don't want to add more pressure on the oil market. Not because somehow those ships evaded US vigilance thanks to Iran's cunning skills.
But this is a damocles sword hanging over Iran. The US could seize those tankers if they want to apply more pressure.
And by doing so escalate more and potentially lead Iran to hit critical infra across the gulf nations and potentially disrupt red sea shipping too. There is too much exposed, expensive and delicate infrastructure to adequately protect. Iran could likely cause far more damage than it already has, and to infrastructure that could lead to years, or even decades, of problems all at a time when oil is starting to wind down. The gulf nations know this. This could transition oil earlier than expected. Hit their oil infra, and their water infra and the region may not recover until oil is no longer in demand. Nations are likely taking notice of how cavalier the US is being with other nations security and prosperity right now. Spain is getting down right hostile and we have a lot of military assets there and along history of joint bases with them. This is potentially a major turning point for supporting the US in any endeavor. Basically, yeah, I am sure we know where those ships are but hopefully we are being as rational as possible somewhere in the government and are holding back in hopes of -something- being salvaged here.
> by doing so escalate more and potentially lead Iran to hit critical infra across the gulf nations and potentially disrupt red sea shipping
Nothing indicates the U.S. is taking Iran's threats of escalation seriously. Like, I think we should. But it doesn't seem to be playing into the calculus. If Iran escalates, the U.S. can too. And I don't think Trump is bluffing about hitting power and water infrastructure.
The reason we aren't hitting the ships is because we want oil to keep flowing into the international markets.
In the past it had less to do with seizing the vessels and more to do with keeping financial flows between organizations offering shipping services and oil hidden from the banking system. America could have easily seized any ship they wanted to during the sanctions over the past decade. They didnt because the sanctions are American constructs: they dont apply on the open seas where UNCLOS matters. America can still seize them, but the legality is murky and comes with a reputational cost.
Now with Hormuz closed, America needs every last oil barrel moving so the economy doesn’t grind to a halt. Remember, it’s a war of choice for the US. We don’t need Iran gone as much as we want low oil prices.
> the sanctions are American constructs: they dont apply on the open seas where UNCLOS matters
Technically correct. But the way these countries evade U.S. sanctions is by flying false or no flag. That, in turn, makes them vulnerable under UNCLOS's anti-piracy rules.
> not like it is hard for the US military to track massive tankers in a small sea
We're not hitting their tankers for the same reason we are suspending sanctions on Russian oil. It's a desperate bid to keep prices at the pump down.
Curious, at what price per barrel does US oil fields get profitable? For their own domestic consumption they don't really need the Irani oil do they ? It seems to be the case that it's rest of the world that needs the oil and US needs the rest of the world to not be pissed at the US.
> at what price per barrel does US oil fields get profitable?
$30 to 70 per barrel [1]. (Pretty much all production is profitable above $100/barrel.)
> they don't really need the Irani oil do they ?
Our refineries can't process our own crude. So we export crude and import refined products.
That said, yes, the oil exports do blunt the net effect of the blow. If pressure really rose, one could tax the excess profits to directly reduce gas prices.
[1] https://www.opxai.com/why-your-oilfield-will-fail-at-60-oil-...
Agree it's a thin disguise. It works because the same sword hangs over Trump's head as well. He needs the price of oil to not spike too high so any oil supply is welcome.
And for all the heated rethoric, both sides have shown a certain restraint so far, which is encouraging. It doesn't feel like a deal is out of the question.
No point in making a deal with the US, they always welch.
> No point in making a deal with the US
Hot take on the internet. Different picture when bombs are raining down on your infrastructure.
> Not because somehow those ships evaded US vigilance thanks to Iran's cunning skills.
Well.. we can't have America look bad. What would that do to the DOW?
> because they don't want to antagonise China more than they need right now
So, it actually does sound like Iran is pretty cunning here.