Have they factored 21 yet? [0] IMO most of us can ignore such pieces until a practical factorization of arbitrary 32 bit integers is demonstrated on a QC. And even after this "easy" milestone is achieved, I think it will be at least a decade until QC will be a practical cryptographic threat. And it's generously assuming that a Moore-like scaling is possible for QC.
Beware the Ides of march: this is 1 of 2 cryptographic doom papers that was released this week. This google paper with Babbush, Gidney, Boneh is authoritative. And we also have another with Preskill and Hsin-Yuan Huang (widely cited for classical shadows among other quantum work) among others: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28627
"Here, by
leveraging advances in high-rate quantum error-correcting codes, efficient logical instruction sets,
and circuit design, we show that Shor’s algorithm can be executed at cryptographically relevant
scales with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits. "
It's unfortunate that we're past the point where all quantum computing progress is public. Between this and the unbearable secrecy of AI labs, balkanization of knowledge is in full force.
> [...] including transitioning blockchains to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is resistant to quantum attacks.
PQC is not defined as "being resistant to quantum attacks" nor does it necessarily have this property: PQC is just cryptography for which no quantum attack is known yet (for example even when no one has tried to design a quantum computation to break the cryptography). One can not demonstrate that a specific PQC altorithm is resistant to quantum attacks, it is merely presumed until proven otherwise.
Why do they care about cryptocurrencies but not about the entire world's infrastructures that are based on RSA and elliptic curve algorithms, such as HTTPS and many other electronic signature solutions? Is this a case of cryptocurrency market manipulation?
And why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies? Aren't they designed to circumvent the government regulation?
> why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies?
Our largest institutions manage tens of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency and the US government has designated currencies appropriate for the strategic crypto reserve
> Why do they [not care] about the entire world's infrastructures that are based on RSA and elliptic curve algorithms, such as HTTPS
I'm sure they do. But if you had a working quantum computer that could a) get Satoshi's keys or b) read some emails, most people choose door a first. So it's both a smoke test and a high value target with an easy to assess dollar value.
Have they factored 21 yet? [0] IMO most of us can ignore such pieces until a practical factorization of arbitrary 32 bit integers is demonstrated on a QC. And even after this "easy" milestone is achieved, I think it will be at least a decade until QC will be a practical cryptographic threat. And it's generously assuming that a Moore-like scaling is possible for QC.
[0]: https://algassert.com/post/2500
Beware the Ides of march: this is 1 of 2 cryptographic doom papers that was released this week. This google paper with Babbush, Gidney, Boneh is authoritative. And we also have another with Preskill and Hsin-Yuan Huang (widely cited for classical shadows among other quantum work) among others: https://arxiv.org/pdf/2603.28627
"Here, by leveraging advances in high-rate quantum error-correcting codes, efficient logical instruction sets, and circuit design, we show that Shor’s algorithm can be executed at cryptographically relevant scales with as few as 10,000 reconfigurable atomic qubits. "
That's physical, not logical qubits.
It's unfortunate that we're past the point where all quantum computing progress is public. Between this and the unbearable secrecy of AI labs, balkanization of knowledge is in full force.
If I find a cryptocurrency vulnerability I am reallocating (the blockchain never lies) as much of it as I can and cashing it out.
Its the only responsible thing to do.
If someone else finds a cryptocurrency vulnerability, they too will reallocate as much of your allocation as they can and cash it out.
> [...] including transitioning blockchains to post-quantum cryptography (PQC), which is resistant to quantum attacks.
PQC is not defined as "being resistant to quantum attacks" nor does it necessarily have this property: PQC is just cryptography for which no quantum attack is known yet (for example even when no one has tried to design a quantum computation to break the cryptography). One can not demonstrate that a specific PQC altorithm is resistant to quantum attacks, it is merely presumed until proven otherwise.
Why do they care about cryptocurrencies but not about the entire world's infrastructures that are based on RSA and elliptic curve algorithms, such as HTTPS and many other electronic signature solutions? Is this a case of cryptocurrency market manipulation?
And why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies? Aren't they designed to circumvent the government regulation?
> Is this market manipulation?
No
> why do they think that the US government would care about securing cryptocurrencies?
Our largest institutions manage tens of billions of dollars in cryptocurrency and the US government has designated currencies appropriate for the strategic crypto reserve
> Why do they [not care] about the entire world's infrastructures that are based on RSA and elliptic curve algorithms, such as HTTPS
I'm sure they do. But if you had a working quantum computer that could a) get Satoshi's keys or b) read some emails, most people choose door a first. So it's both a smoke test and a high value target with an easy to assess dollar value.
https://security.googleblog.com/2026/02/cultivating-robust-a...
i think google is just a disgustingly large company lol, it's hard to talk about them "caring" about one thing but not another