The article is very vague on how the radioactivity allows detection of leaking gas.
The video at the bottom explains from 7:50 in. Gas pressure pressing on a spring holds a radiation shield in place. If the gas leaks the shield moves and the radiation can be detected.
MH-53E maintainer here. The system is IBIS (Inflight Blade Inspection System) and the little pods are BIM (blade inspection monitors). The box is pretty obvious sitting just behind the main rotor on the deck above the center engine. I found a random picture on the web:
The IBIS devices provide in-flight warning of blade failure on various models of helicopters. One device is located on the root of each blade attached to the rotor. The IBIS detects a decrease in pressure in the blades of a CH-53 model helicopter. Any cracks in the blades will result in a decrease in air pressure in the blade. Such cracks could result in structural failure in the blade, thereby resulting in a potentially dangerous operational situation for the helicopter, such as a hard landing and/or injury to the craft and/or personnel up to, and including, death. Each device contains approximately 500 microcuries (18.5 MBq) of strontium-90 (Sr-90) in the form of a rolled metal foil, encased in a small stainless steel protective cylinder about the size of the press button on a ballpoint pen. The external radiation level of the IBIS is 0.8 mR/hr at 3 inches in the normal (shielded) mode, and 75 mR/hr at 12 inches in the failure (extended) mode.
The titanium spar is filled with gas. If there was a crack in the spar the gas would escape, therefore tripping the pressure sensitive radiation shield. Releasing radiation that can be detected inside the helicopter.
Often in software development I encounter code that seems overly complex. It's not always obvious at first glance whether that complexity is because it's solving a really difficult problem, or because the developers made it more complex than it needed to be.
Having no domain knowledge of the problems of detecting cracks in blades, this sounds like either a genius solution to a super hard problem, or unnecessary complexity.
Given the forces involved, the need to avoid wireless communication, the complexity of any bearing with associated electrical contact, and so on this seems like the least complicated solution. You can rely on radioactive elements to emit radioactivity above background, you can build a pretty reliable pressure indicator, and you can fill a cavity in the blades with gas pretty reliably. You sidestep all of the complicated mechanical linkages in favor of a solution that's not in the rotor hub at all.
I though it sounded pretty clever. Now, that can be good or bad depending on context. I mean it in a good way. It seems simple conceptually (I have no idea if it adds a lot of complexity to the manufacturing) and rather foolproof. I guess the radiation shield could jam and not move when it should.
What if the helicopter would have to operate in a contaminated area? Wouldn't it cause false positives?
> The CH-53 Sea Stallion first entered service in 1966
1966 is Cold War era, so, I think, an idea that a military helicopter would have to fly in an area that has been recently nuked wasn't totally inconceivable...
Strontium-90 is a beta emitter, apparently, so you could just measure Alpha, Beta, and Gamma and detect false positives due to elevated background radiation that way. If you're in the air you're probably much closer to your Beta source as well so you could detect it above background due to distance. Gamma is essentially light so it falls off with the square of distance. But Alpha and Beta are probably much worse than Gamma in that respect, so I'm guessing this is fine most of the time and then they rule out false positives by looking at the total background in each type of radiation.
Assuming only one rotor cracks, then the radiation is from one rotor IBIS and the detector electronics could detect radiation levels that ripple synchronously with the rotor speed.
The Strontium-90 is a beta radiation emitter.
The external radiation level of the IBIS [is] 75 mR/hr at 12 inches in the failure (extended) mode.
Exposure to a nuclear blast doesn't necessarily make things radioactive. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not radioactive wastelands. Even in Chernobyl, the other reactors continued to operate for a time after the accident, and nature is thriving.
But, the radiation detector is on the upper surface of the rear fuselage. Hypothetical Beta particles from the ground will strike the underside of the aircraft and not the detector.
The article is very vague on how the radioactivity allows detection of leaking gas.
The video at the bottom explains from 7:50 in. Gas pressure pressing on a spring holds a radiation shield in place. If the gas leaks the shield moves and the radiation can be detected.
There's a good comment:
https://assets.verticalmag.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/MH...And:
From https://public-inspection.federalregister.gov/2019-08531.pdf...The titanium spar is filled with gas. If there was a crack in the spar the gas would escape, therefore tripping the pressure sensitive radiation shield. Releasing radiation that can be detected inside the helicopter.
Wireless systems aren’t used for opsec reasons.
Often in software development I encounter code that seems overly complex. It's not always obvious at first glance whether that complexity is because it's solving a really difficult problem, or because the developers made it more complex than it needed to be.
Having no domain knowledge of the problems of detecting cracks in blades, this sounds like either a genius solution to a super hard problem, or unnecessary complexity.
Given the forces involved, the need to avoid wireless communication, the complexity of any bearing with associated electrical contact, and so on this seems like the least complicated solution. You can rely on radioactive elements to emit radioactivity above background, you can build a pretty reliable pressure indicator, and you can fill a cavity in the blades with gas pretty reliably. You sidestep all of the complicated mechanical linkages in favor of a solution that's not in the rotor hub at all.
I though it sounded pretty clever. Now, that can be good or bad depending on context. I mean it in a good way. It seems simple conceptually (I have no idea if it adds a lot of complexity to the manufacturing) and rather foolproof. I guess the radiation shield could jam and not move when it should.
Chesterton's Fence
What if the helicopter would have to operate in a contaminated area? Wouldn't it cause false positives?
> The CH-53 Sea Stallion first entered service in 1966
1966 is Cold War era, so, I think, an idea that a military helicopter would have to fly in an area that has been recently nuked wasn't totally inconceivable...
Strontium-90 is a beta emitter, apparently, so you could just measure Alpha, Beta, and Gamma and detect false positives due to elevated background radiation that way. If you're in the air you're probably much closer to your Beta source as well so you could detect it above background due to distance. Gamma is essentially light so it falls off with the square of distance. But Alpha and Beta are probably much worse than Gamma in that respect, so I'm guessing this is fine most of the time and then they rule out false positives by looking at the total background in each type of radiation.
Assuming only one rotor cracks, then the radiation is from one rotor IBIS and the detector electronics could detect radiation levels that ripple synchronously with the rotor speed.
The Strontium-90 is a beta radiation emitter.
Exposure to a nuclear blast doesn't necessarily make things radioactive. Hiroshima and Nagasaki are not radioactive wastelands. Even in Chernobyl, the other reactors continued to operate for a time after the accident, and nature is thriving.
But, the radiation detector is on the upper surface of the rear fuselage. Hypothetical Beta particles from the ground will strike the underside of the aircraft and not the detector.
> Exposure to a nuclear blast doesn't necessarily make things radioactive
Isn’t this neutron activation?
It is, but a) it's a probabilistic process and b) most of the products decay rapidly, down to the background level in a matter of days.
Terrible explanation