There's a solution: personal liability for the executives and managers at the company, and for the investors.
For example, every person who has ever worked for IDScan at any level of management should have all lifetime compensation clawed back and then pay a further 2x of that in fines. All VCs in the company should face personal liability up to 10% of their net worth. (Fines should be based on net worth; see e.g., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/flat-fines-wealth...)
This is a little harsh. What about requiring companies to carry management liability insurance? Or to list individual managers on cybersecurity insurance policies? Premiums will rise when a company employs managers with claims history. Eventually, it becomes difficult to employ them in key positions if they have a bad track record.
Near the beginning of my career, I talked to a greybeard who harrumphed at me discussing something-or-other and said "computer security is an oxymoron". I thought he was being too pessimistic, nowadays I realize he was right.
Its unfortunate that the security requirements are expected from the for-profit businesses when the cost of paying penalties for breach of security is way lower than actually implementing the security.
Ironically in case of breach they just sell you another of their product where you put your personal information again
The CRAs compete for breach business, because it's absolutely a profitable enterprise for them:
How many people actually sign up for your "free credit monitoring for a year" following a breach?
When you do, you typically do so by signing up for the highest tier (sometimes $30 or even $50 a month) product with a redemption code for one year free. You have to enter a credit card to do so, and to no-one's surprise, if you don't cancel in time, it automatically converts to a paid subscription "for your convenience".
There are many consumer protection farces in the US, but right up there has to be the notion that "identity theft" is the consumer's responsibility/obligation to prevent or resolve, not the entity that actually had the data stolen. You're considered liable until you prove innocence, even though you did nothing wrong.
This very nearly burned me when buying my home - having been an AT&T customer in the PNW for nearly two decades, "I" apparently decided to hit up a Walmart on the outskirts of El Paso, sign up for a Verizon service, run up two months of international calls and bail out.
Despite a police report, my utility statements, AT&T bills, etc. (all of which were, to be blunt, none of VZWs business), VZW stood by it initially, "On review of your documentation, we remain satisfied that this debt belongs to you based on the documents used to open your account".
I asked to see them, since they were, in VZW's own words, "mine". "We can't, for customer privacy reasons." Oh, so "mine when the bill needs paid, may not be mine for privacy purposes".
The breach is bad no doubt-- but this information was already readily available to bad actors e.g. via Lexis Nexis. Practically all states sell DL and registration information to information brokers, and the remaining ones require you to obtain auto insurance, and the insurers all sell the information.
Many people pretend this isn't happening because of the "The Drivers Privacy Protection Act" but the DPPA is paper thin protection at best as it has a long list of permitted uses which anyone can just lie about (and are you worried about threats from parties so honest they're unable to lie?). Not that they usually have to lie given that the permitted uses include "For use by licensed private investigation agencies" and "For the bulk distribution of surveys, marketing materials, or solicitations"... In practice this just means accessing the information costs a little money and requires someone check a "this is for a permitted purpose" checkbox. The biggest impact is that it causes abusers of the information to be circumspect about their sources, which helps maintain the data-harvesting status quo.
(Guess what: the same databases also have ALPR gathered pictures of your car at whatever locations its been in public view... stores, your home, your mistresses home... Makes flock (YC S17) look pretty mild by comparison. The fundamental sin is requiring ID without also making it a crime for anyone but the owner and issuer to posses someone elses ID information.)
In some sense the IDScan breach may (ultimately) improve our privacy and security because it will break people out of the FALSE belief that this information is private, or that it can be protected by anything short of restricting its collection in the first place.
When this first landed I asked what the fix could even be. Everyone needs a new ID at a minimum. But then I got to thinking: 1) is that the point? Conspiratorial thinking I know but “hey all
Our ids got hacked I guess we need a national id”. And related 2) the current id system from a security standpoint was a band aid fix for outdated world to be shoehorned into a modern one. IDscan was never cryptographic proof you were who you said you were. Maybe better than “enter your name and SSN” but bottom line, at least in US there is no cryptographically secure identity system that proves you are the citizen you say. And that fact bleeds into all sorts of patchwork solutions, fraud, etc. Moreover there are serious philosophical hurdles to getting to one. I’m not even positive I want one. But unless there is some zero-trust way to do this, I’m not sure what the fix would be.
> IDscan was never cryptographic proof you were who you said you were. Maybe better than “enter your name and SSN”
With the benefit of hindsight, we'd have all been better off if SSNs had been so obviously flagrantly public that nobody would ever consider them a trust-factor.
And then, in real life, one discovers that institutions route around in creative ways for all sorts of different reasons ( recently had to 2fa a transaction at a god damn teller window; you just took my DL ).
Hundreds of millions of American's names, addresses, social security numbers, etc were in the NPD leak which has been publicly downloadable. The idea that any of this information should be considered private, only knowable by the person themself is wrong.
There's a solution: personal liability for the executives and managers at the company, and for the investors.
For example, every person who has ever worked for IDScan at any level of management should have all lifetime compensation clawed back and then pay a further 2x of that in fines. All VCs in the company should face personal liability up to 10% of their net worth. (Fines should be based on net worth; see e.g., https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/15/opinion/flat-fines-wealth...)
This is a little harsh. What about requiring companies to carry management liability insurance? Or to list individual managers on cybersecurity insurance policies? Premiums will rise when a company employs managers with claims history. Eventually, it becomes difficult to employ them in key positions if they have a bad track record.
It's cleaner to hold some of a corp's money in escrow if they're handling IDs, to ensure they can't avoid fines via bankruptcy.
Including investors is a bit much unless they encouraged or mandated some decisons that enabled this.
This.
Great way to incentivize everyone to do nothing. Most middle managers don’t know shit.
Near the beginning of my career, I talked to a greybeard who harrumphed at me discussing something-or-other and said "computer security is an oxymoron". I thought he was being too pessimistic, nowadays I realize he was right.
Human security. Computers are fine, they usually do exactly as they’re programmed.
Will anything be different _this time around_?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2015_Office_of_Personnel_Manag... was a National Security Disaster and I'm not sure we saw useful concrete changes.
Equifax's stock price went up when they were hacked.
Joking right :)
Its unfortunate that the security requirements are expected from the for-profit businesses when the cost of paying penalties for breach of security is way lower than actually implementing the security.
Ironically in case of breach they just sell you another of their product where you put your personal information again
The CRAs compete for breach business, because it's absolutely a profitable enterprise for them:
How many people actually sign up for your "free credit monitoring for a year" following a breach?
When you do, you typically do so by signing up for the highest tier (sometimes $30 or even $50 a month) product with a redemption code for one year free. You have to enter a credit card to do so, and to no-one's surprise, if you don't cancel in time, it automatically converts to a paid subscription "for your convenience".
There are many consumer protection farces in the US, but right up there has to be the notion that "identity theft" is the consumer's responsibility/obligation to prevent or resolve, not the entity that actually had the data stolen. You're considered liable until you prove innocence, even though you did nothing wrong.
This very nearly burned me when buying my home - having been an AT&T customer in the PNW for nearly two decades, "I" apparently decided to hit up a Walmart on the outskirts of El Paso, sign up for a Verizon service, run up two months of international calls and bail out.
Despite a police report, my utility statements, AT&T bills, etc. (all of which were, to be blunt, none of VZWs business), VZW stood by it initially, "On review of your documentation, we remain satisfied that this debt belongs to you based on the documents used to open your account".
I asked to see them, since they were, in VZW's own words, "mine". "We can't, for customer privacy reasons." Oh, so "mine when the bill needs paid, may not be mine for privacy purposes".
The breach is bad no doubt-- but this information was already readily available to bad actors e.g. via Lexis Nexis. Practically all states sell DL and registration information to information brokers, and the remaining ones require you to obtain auto insurance, and the insurers all sell the information.
Many people pretend this isn't happening because of the "The Drivers Privacy Protection Act" but the DPPA is paper thin protection at best as it has a long list of permitted uses which anyone can just lie about (and are you worried about threats from parties so honest they're unable to lie?). Not that they usually have to lie given that the permitted uses include "For use by licensed private investigation agencies" and "For the bulk distribution of surveys, marketing materials, or solicitations"... In practice this just means accessing the information costs a little money and requires someone check a "this is for a permitted purpose" checkbox. The biggest impact is that it causes abusers of the information to be circumspect about their sources, which helps maintain the data-harvesting status quo.
(Guess what: the same databases also have ALPR gathered pictures of your car at whatever locations its been in public view... stores, your home, your mistresses home... Makes flock (YC S17) look pretty mild by comparison. The fundamental sin is requiring ID without also making it a crime for anyone but the owner and issuer to posses someone elses ID information.)
In some sense the IDScan breach may (ultimately) improve our privacy and security because it will break people out of the FALSE belief that this information is private, or that it can be protected by anything short of restricting its collection in the first place.
I really want these people handling my healthcare and other details about my life.
Private healthcare is much worse, seemingly they have an open access policy. New breaches occur in the order of millions per week. Not remotely newsworthy anymore. (last time this was mainstream worthy was 200M leaked records in 2024). Last week https://www.securityweek.com/4-1-million-impacted-by-adapthe... Week before that https://www.yahoo.com/news/us/articles/more-9-5-million-pati... 2 weeks before that: https://www.msn.com/en-us/health/general/carecloud-confirms-...
Which people? This leak was caused completely by private businesses.
When this first landed I asked what the fix could even be. Everyone needs a new ID at a minimum. But then I got to thinking: 1) is that the point? Conspiratorial thinking I know but “hey all Our ids got hacked I guess we need a national id”. And related 2) the current id system from a security standpoint was a band aid fix for outdated world to be shoehorned into a modern one. IDscan was never cryptographic proof you were who you said you were. Maybe better than “enter your name and SSN” but bottom line, at least in US there is no cryptographically secure identity system that proves you are the citizen you say. And that fact bleeds into all sorts of patchwork solutions, fraud, etc. Moreover there are serious philosophical hurdles to getting to one. I’m not even positive I want one. But unless there is some zero-trust way to do this, I’m not sure what the fix would be.
> IDscan was never cryptographic proof you were who you said you were. Maybe better than “enter your name and SSN”
With the benefit of hindsight, we'd have all been better off if SSNs had been so obviously flagrantly public that nobody would ever consider them a trust-factor.
And then, in real life, one discovers that institutions route around in creative ways for all sorts of different reasons ( recently had to 2fa a transaction at a god damn teller window; you just took my DL ).
Passports seem a lot better. You scan it with NFC, and the chip inside proves authenticity via asymmetric crypto.
Glad to see someone talking about this
Hundreds of millions of American's names, addresses, social security numbers, etc were in the NPD leak which has been publicly downloadable. The idea that any of this information should be considered private, only knowable by the person themself is wrong.
Slackers are always behind this shit