The article estimates the number of these routers in the author's home country (Belgium), but the vulnerability would exist in units sold worldwide, no? Seems to me that their estimates of affected units are a couple orders of magnitude low.
> The article estimates the number of these routers in the author's home country (Belgium), but the vulnerability would exist in units sold worldwide, no?
It seems like the author is aware of the undercount, no?
FTFA:
> [This issue] affects dozens of vendors, hundreds of products, and millions of Broadcom-based access points worldwide. In an effort to discover all affected vendors and devices, I’m providing a fingerprinting script and YARA rule so you can help me document the blast radius.
> ...
> I demonstrated that the vulnerability is present and exploitable on 3 out of 4 Belgian Internet Service Providers including Proximus (BBOX 3V+), VOO (Netgear CG3100, Netgear CG3700, Technicolor 7210, CGA4233) and Orange (ASKEY TCG3000). Telenet may be affected through Sagemcom F@st devices, but I could not get my hands on one.
> As of October 15th, 2026, none of these affected devices have been patched. This means you can get a root shell from across the street on a significant proportion of routers in Belgium, and probably elsewhere.
> ...
> I did some napkin math with my friend Sol using data published by the IBPT and public communication from the ISPs about model release over the years. I have medium confidence in these numbers; hopefully the ISPs will start communicating about the exact number of affected devices once this hits the Internet. [A table that contains guestimates of number of affected subscribers from the four Belgian ISPs mentioned above follows.]
> ...
> And this is *not* limited to Belgium. Affected manufacturers serve a larger market.
> ...or someone spends a bit of time with an AI to come up with a patch?
Based on the guy's slides [0], it seems like Broadcom has already released a fixed version. The slide numbered as 97 contains this part of what I assume is an email with Broadcom:
Thank you for your above-cited report. This report is based on Broadcom’s 18.1 SDK release.
Broadcom has known about this specific vulnerability for a long time; other external entities have also reported it to us. For several years, Broadcom has been offering its customers updated software that lacks this vulnerability.
In particular, the WPS implementation in this old software package (based on WPS Monitor) was obsoleted several years ago and replaced starting in 2018 by a new implementation based on HostAPD and WPA Supplicant.
The blog post makes it sound like there was no updated version, but the guy's email with Broadcom says otherwise. If we knew the name of the SDK, we could check the release notes and maybe get the truth. I gave up after like a minute of searching for the name, but perhaps others are more interested in the search than I am.
Broadcom just makes the chip right? So customers in this sense would be the router OEMs like netgear who may not have distributed the new update to end devices.
The article estimates the number of these routers in the author's home country (Belgium), but the vulnerability would exist in units sold worldwide, no? Seems to me that their estimates of affected units are a couple orders of magnitude low.
> The article estimates the number of these routers in the author's home country (Belgium), but the vulnerability would exist in units sold worldwide, no?
It seems like the author is aware of the undercount, no?
FTFA:
> [This issue] affects dozens of vendors, hundreds of products, and millions of Broadcom-based access points worldwide. In an effort to discover all affected vendors and devices, I’m providing a fingerprinting script and YARA rule so you can help me document the blast radius.
> ...
> I demonstrated that the vulnerability is present and exploitable on 3 out of 4 Belgian Internet Service Providers including Proximus (BBOX 3V+), VOO (Netgear CG3100, Netgear CG3700, Technicolor 7210, CGA4233) and Orange (ASKEY TCG3000). Telenet may be affected through Sagemcom F@st devices, but I could not get my hands on one.
> As of October 15th, 2026, none of these affected devices have been patched. This means you can get a root shell from across the street on a significant proportion of routers in Belgium, and probably elsewhere.
> ...
> I did some napkin math with my friend Sol using data published by the IBPT and public communication from the ISPs about model release over the years. I have medium confidence in these numbers; hopefully the ISPs will start communicating about the exact number of affected devices once this hits the Internet. [A table that contains guestimates of number of affected subscribers from the four Belgian ISPs mentioned above follows.]
> ...
> And this is *not* limited to Belgium. Affected manufacturers serve a larger market.
unless affected Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are willing to migrate.
...or someone spends a bit of time with an AI to come up with a patch? Bonus points for one that can be remotely installed using the same exploit...
> ...or someone spends a bit of time with an AI to come up with a patch?
Based on the guy's slides [0], it seems like Broadcom has already released a fixed version. The slide numbered as 97 contains this part of what I assume is an email with Broadcom:
The blog post makes it sound like there was no updated version, but the guy's email with Broadcom says otherwise. If we knew the name of the SDK, we could check the release notes and maybe get the truth. I gave up after like a minute of searching for the name, but perhaps others are more interested in the search than I am.[0] <https://quentinkaiser.be/assets/qkaiser-broadcom-wps-hexacon...>
Broadcom just makes the chip right? So customers in this sense would be the router OEMs like netgear who may not have distributed the new update to end devices.