That has no effect, since the'd get no such business from now.
What's sad it they won't be taking their certs with them. Let's hope the powers up the chain conduct some deep self-refection on their part in thus fiasco.
I noticed that as well. Figured it was a concurrency issue, and they have a follow-up message that you can see if you click on the OP of the Mastodon thread that confirmed my guess: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117476097901925573
>(yes the code is off by a few. its bc the poc is shit and to speed it up it uses 8 connections at the same time. it just stops the counter once it has a hit so its off by ~4 lmfao. you could easily fix this but cba today)
Only if they're lazy and went with the "download key and certificate (and we'll generate the keys for you)" option. Otherwise at least how it's supposed to work is that you give a CA a certificate signing request (CSR) containing your public key, they sign it and hand back your certificate. The certificate itself doesn't contain anything sensitive, because it's the same thing that your server presents to clients. But people are lazy and might not know how to generate a csr locally, hence the aforementioned option. And of course if they're too lazy to generate a csr locally, they're probably also too lazy to keep backups, so you can be sure that eMudhra keeps a copy in case they deleted it from their downloads folder.
They put the public key into js and encrypt the body of the request. This is common practice to protect users' important data from being accessed by a proxy (in this case, Cloudflare) and is ok.
But the real bug is that they don't rate-limit, invalidate, or protect the endpoint related to OTP checks, so it can be brute-forced, as the search space is limited.
This site serves me garbage. Iocaine, I think? I use Brave.
"If you are not [a bot], and you feel you have been served garbage by mistake, please contact the owner of the site you're visiting."
If anyone knows another way to access the content, I'd be interested. No contact details are offered and visiting mastodon.catgirl.cloud resets my connection.
Oh man, good that they are leaving the CA business.
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50195110
That has no effect, since the'd get no such business from now.
What's sad it they won't be taking their certs with them. Let's hope the powers up the chain conduct some deep self-refection on their part in thus fiasco.
> Let's hope the powers up the chain conduct some deep self-refection on their part in thus fiasco.
that almost never happens.
stop hoping corporations grow a soul and a conscience.
Who said anything about soul or conscience? Getting hacked doesn't deliver value for shareholders
The anti AI scraping on this site doesn't work that well. I'm being served non-sense text about buttplugs. I'm human, I swear.
anti-AI scraping is often anti-privacy in practice, as any effective implementation requires invasive browser inspection to detect scrapers.
That was proof of soul check and you passed
That's what comes after the verification can.
that's actually the exploit, it was very physical
We're living in a South Park episode.
The number the tool found was 1861. The e-mailed OTP code was 1858. What am I missing?
I noticed that as well. Figured it was a concurrency issue, and they have a follow-up message that you can see if you click on the OP of the Mastodon thread that confirmed my guess: https://mastodon.catgirl.cloud/@49016/117476097901925573
>(yes the code is off by a few. its bc the poc is shit and to speed it up it uses 8 connections at the same time. it just stops the counter once it has a hit so its off by ~4 lmfao. you could easily fix this but cba today)
So basically anyone who used this CA is screwed if someone knows your email?
Only if they're lazy and went with the "download key and certificate (and we'll generate the keys for you)" option. Otherwise at least how it's supposed to work is that you give a CA a certificate signing request (CSR) containing your public key, they sign it and hand back your certificate. The certificate itself doesn't contain anything sensitive, because it's the same thing that your server presents to clients. But people are lazy and might not know how to generate a csr locally, hence the aforementioned option. And of course if they're too lazy to generate a csr locally, they're probably also too lazy to keep backups, so you can be sure that eMudhra keeps a copy in case they deleted it from their downloads folder.
With this exploit, what's stopping me from sending my own CSR for your domain?
I understand it in the following way:
They put the public key into js and encrypt the body of the request. This is common practice to protect users' important data from being accessed by a proxy (in this case, Cloudflare) and is ok.
But the real bug is that they don't rate-limit, invalidate, or protect the endpoint related to OTP checks, so it can be brute-forced, as the search space is limited.
so not sure why the author shows us the public key
Could someone explain this? Does this mean that it enables logging in as any account in emudhras infra?
Yes, it’s a complete auth bypass. All you need is the email address of a user and they’ll likely sign CSRs for any domains under that account.
It’s the end for them, I imagine.
Don't piss off the internet, there will be consequences. I guess.
Security represents less than 1% of their business.
Aye, but it'll now represent much, much more than 1% of their corporate reputation.
Purported security, you mean.
Actual security, add some zeros ;)
Damn, these Mastodon accounts are a rabbit hole to get lost in
Hahahahha what a roast. Too funny, especially the "4 Bars" in the background of the demo.
"S" in "eMudhra stands for "Secure".
This site serves me garbage. Iocaine, I think? I use Brave.
"If you are not [a bot], and you feel you have been served garbage by mistake, please contact the owner of the site you're visiting."
If anyone knows another way to access the content, I'd be interested. No contact details are offered and visiting mastodon.catgirl.cloud resets my connection.
You can use https://github.com/jwilk/zygolophodon to read Mastodon posts in your terminal:
Doesn't that also fetch the content directly? So depending on the logic of the filter it likely won't make any difference.
It uses the API, which hopefully is protected from bots less fiercely.
https://archive.ph/Vnlt9
Ah yes, adopting the standard cloudflare approach. "Contact the site administrator to resolve this" but no contact details are provided.
Please can this not be true..