The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.
Client side A/B testing through services like Optimizely and VWO and Adobe Target is a massive security nightmare in of itself. You're giving anyone with access to a third party service the ability to run any code they like on your website, and change any and all interface elements as they see fit.
Even one of these accounts being compromised would be a massive security incident that would potentially put millions of people's data at risk.
Just pointing out that these testing solutions can also be deployed server-side instead of via client-side tags. I suspect that is the route a lot of their customers will take now.
It also makes adding csp a nightmare. Your marketing department is putting in 30 trackers, changing monthly. And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src. You can’t possibly get anything locked down enough. That’s bad for security when you rely on csp for mitigating other factors.
A certificate-based approach for scripts residing on different domains, for example, so you can be sure it hasn't been tampered with.
A javascript file served from example-a.com should be able to run on example-b.org only if it has been signed with the same TLS key used for example-a.com .
Vet everything, cut down to 2-3 services tops. Selfhost analytics whenever possible. Point to the OP article when asked why we can’t blindly put 30 tags using GTM.
That is not any more secure if you are just blindly proxying the third party scripts and in fact is worse since it runs in the context of your own domain.
I mean, really that situation is CSP finally earning its keep. Put whatever you want in tag manager but at the end of the day it's not going to work unless I review it.
Not going to happen. Most decisions in tech do not factor in risk, only cost. Risk mitigation usually requires considerable spend, and very few people/companies are willing to spend on low-probability events.
What is that saying? A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.
If it's criminal for sites to accidentally serve malware, what does it mean for open source projects to accidentally get hit by supply chain attacks, or for them to get compromised by a rogue contributor (eg. xz)?
Those website operators include third-party code willingly and explicitly. There was never an accident. There is no supply-chain attack here: you cannot seriously claim that unaudited, unauthenticated terminal with root security principal getting used is an attack.
If your website is making any requests outside of the original domain, there's no "accidental" in anything the website does.
A business in the US has legal liability if they fail to do their due diligence in their supply chain and it turns out their suppliers are involved in human trafficking, child labor, forced labor, etc. or is using hazardous materials in the product.
There should be standards that people have to live up to if they are going to provide a product, even for free, to others.
One could distinguish between criminal negligence and forgivable negligence in court. Unfortunately for GP that probably means you can't actually stick charges on anybody who serves malware via an ad network like this.
Easy solution: Don't use ad networks. That'll likely free your site from illegal tracking, as well as ad trash, and will even improve your lIgHtHoUsE score!
> A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
I never really understood this idiom, because how can a PHB engineering manager (for example) be required to not understand their team's technology in order to retain their job? Surely if that manager knows their team's work inside out then they would be a more effective manager - which is good for everyone?
If I squint-my-brain, I can see how (for example) that anyone who works full-time as an SEO "consultant" in the year 2026 would only be if they actually believed that SEO tricks actually worked, which requires them to not understand how modern search-engines' spiders actually work (because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s). Am I close?
Because it is not the PHB that starts the problem. It is someone from some other department (usually marketing) who wants tracking, wants it now and wants it done with GTM and will whine to th C-levels until the engineers add Google Tag Manager.
It's not the team's technology that's being referred to. It's about hazards. People whose job it is to do X have a hard time understanding that X shouldn't be done.
In this case, it's the dangers of the tracking and advertising frameworks being used for hostile purposes.
Just had marketing try to add all OTHER previous page events to a new event, because they didn't want to to go through the trouble of creating a dashboard using the user funnel to this feature.
They knew they could do it, and how, they just didn't want to spend 10 minutes doing it themselves. To them, asking an engineer to do it in code is easier because it only takes a minute to ask.
The owners of the ad platforms end up dictating what data is used, they have the leverage and also marketing departments with power end up forcing engineering to use the audience tools Google and Meta provide. At least GTM gets blocked by ad-blockers.
We got 10MB of javascript (maybe 10 years ago...) because engineering needs to build one frontend with multi browser and multi screen support so they picked an off-the-shelf do-everything framework like Amber or Angular, or a react/redux build with 300 nested dependencies.
No, the 10MB (sometimes way more) of JavaScript for a damn news article has nothing to do with SPA frameworks (Angular) or libraries like React. It is tracking malware put there by marketing/advertising idiots.
I remember when this first became a thing when page size was important. I fought tooth and nail with marketing to try and block tag manager. I've had third party URLs block production apps in Chrome before because some marketing url was hosting malicious code.
The most infuriating thing, when you do remove these tags, marketing forgets they exist and are like "Oh we don't use that anymore".
Porqué no los dos? Both are true. Heavy JS frameworks, ads, trackers, etc., but also heavy web fonts, of which maybe 5 icons are used for the site, but the font weighs a megabyte. Just in case you need it.
Those were decisions at a time engineering was time constrained. All those ancillary things are returning to engineering since its just one more prompt now to manage it.
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Are you sure? The affected companies are going to totally make Optimizely pay for damages. That could become a lot of money pretty fast. And tbh, I'm not sure that the average ToS's maximum liability ceiling will hold up in court with a blast radius this big.
Usually, the plaintiff/claimant has to prove the damages they suffered, not the damages their (non-paying) users suffered. So then they would have to claim reputation damage or something like that, and that might not be so easy to prove.
It could happen but if you look at the last few decades of losses from software bugs, it’s exceedingly rare for the cost to be more than lost future business, and even that’s unusual. Remember when CrowdStrike brought down businesses around the world and they suffered … having their share price more than double?
Accountability is incompatible with tech sector as it currently exists. The entire ethos of move fast and break things is incompatible with it never mind the shady adtech part of the sector.
Partially but don’t think that quite follows. A lot of businesses aren’t as fraught with conflicts of interest as tech.
A company making say bricks has an incentive to cut costs too certainly but they’re not implementing loot boxes, tracking people semi covertly, implementing dark patterns to boost engagement by any means or heaven forbid launching missies based on sketchy AI decisions.
> I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
This is the bare minimum. Automatic 3rd party requests should be considered data unsolicited data disclosure under GDPR.
This is likely a result of Optimizely cutting headcount on their legacy product engineering teams to reallocate funding towards their AI product. We’re going to see more stories like this for every company taking a similar approach.
There's a missing step in the explanation. Do major websites like CNN and BBC handle cryptocurrency or credit cards on the same website? Why? Or is there also a browser security bug?
I had the same question, and I really wish these reports would make in clearer what exactly the malware can and can't do. The whole point of web browsers is that sites run in a sandbox so that even if a site does serve malicious code, it should be limited to just that site.
From what I could tell, the malware just generally looked at anything on the page, in cookies/local storage, or clipboard that looks like a crypto address or credit card number. So for sites like CNN or BBC they shouldn't be able to do much damage unless there is a subscription page for example that takes credit card number.
However, the malware also delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which do take advantage of browser vulnerabilities in iOS to cause more serious damage.
I feel that whole web site model is broken. They are run in "sandbox" same way AI companies run their sandboxes. Not caring at all where they do call... So every other site needs to implement protections against other sites.
The model is broken on fundamental level and it will never be fixed.
Yes. But many, if not most of the affected sites where 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable. Some random ad financed site are different stories, there you might just move on.
> 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
> Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.
The article states the opposite, which I’m almost certain was due to the attacker realizing that Content-Security-Policy was blocking the payload on many sites:
“A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.”
Even if they weren't (I have not studied the details), when using NoScript and something does not work you need to enable additional domains. It is infeasible to find the minimal necessary set, so you'll end up with a long allow list.
And an allow list where I’ve made decisions about individual exceptions is a problem why? Do you think having a long list of exceptions is a security problem compared to the entire Internet?
Don't know about noscript specifically, but uMatrix has a default block-list that's safe to enable by default and that includes optimizely. So allowing everything except this default block-list would have protected you from this attack already without any inconvenience of managing allow-lists.
This is simply incorrect. I still use umatrix. On bloated sites there's typically only one or two key domains that need to be permitted. Once you've been running it for a while you can usually guess which ones are needed based on what the grid of resources looks like. Most third party domains aren't required most of the time even for what you described above as "serious businesses". I block most of the third party resources on my bank's website. Honestly the number of dependencies that they pull in absolutely disgusts me; their online banking interface absolutely chugs on low end devices.
I ran uMatrix as well for a long time, and in general there were very few sites where you had to enable JS across the board.
Was a pain though on eCommerce sites as they'd often switch payment processors and then you had to do the whole dance of partially successful payments until you found the right set of allow lists.
Agree, it takes about a week to allow like 60% of pages we visit daily. Then over a month the rest of sites that we occasionally visit. Then there are the pages that completely break when we remove the ad js crap, and then you can take a decision on if you want to continue using that site or not. I have also messages a couple of smaller sites that break when you removed googles tracking, because of the order they load JS, and they promptly fixed it.
I often do so regularly, and have built up passive knowledge about what shit to enable and what not. Optimizely is very far in the realms of shit not getting enabled. I have not had a single instance of it being useful for me as a visitor or user of a website. It does not serve me and it's trash.
If by serious businesses you mean ones that view the inclusion of megabytes of unvetted JS as a security risk and a failure of engineering, there are few serious businesses.
> We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
Optimizely is slowly dying ever since they forced new customers into their DXP/Saas solution.
Optimizely, or Episerver as it was previously called, was such a pleasure to work on - but since version 13 they more or less vendor locked you into their own authentication (Opti ID / Entra AD (?)) and their Optimizely Graph for search and content look up. You can keep self-hosting but you won't get access to Opti Id or Graph if you're not on their tenant.
I guess this is the inevitable happen - everyone gets hacked at the same time when hosting on a SaaS platform.
Completely true about their auth, each time I have to use their service, it's incredibly complicated to even login, their policies for password expiration are ridiculous and you are constantly prompted to move your credentials to newer systems without any benefit.
To be honest I'm surprised that only $7040 was stolen in 9 hours. That seems like a low amount for the amount of traffic the affected sites get in those 9 hours.
These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
The models are using language correctly, but their whole universe is limited to a single session. They're not aware that all the previous sessions also used the same phrase, that you've seen it 10 times in the last hour, etc.
Humans naturally avoid repeating the exact same phrases and jokes they just heard from several other sources, but sometimes you can see the same phenomenon with people too: when there's new bullshit phrase or trend spreading through tiktok/instagram (or popular press), there's a brief moment you can catch many normies regurgitating the exact same phrase "independently".
The front of the meme virality wave sure does look weird.
> These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
It’s not high-quality, though — it’s SEO speak to pad blog posts without adding anything of substance. We notice it more because that stuff is so common in the training data but not the experience of anyone who doesn’t spend time on content mills.
Because if you ignore the surrounding context and any broader technical details that are relevant then the phrasing itself in a vacuum isn't awkward at all. In fact I'd say it reads like well polished marketing copy. The trouble is that not only does it not exist in a vacuum but also all of us are sick of what has now become utterly cliche voicing.
1. The former seems to have a tiny fraction as much detail as the latter.
2. The former seems super more clear to me to be AI generated prose.
3. The latter explicitly continue talks about the actions they took, that they reached out to the affected parties, etc. From a quick scan, it does not appear that the former claims to have done anything themself?
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Doesn't GTM detect malware, or was this malware only being served to non Google IP addresses? Even so, I'm sure Google has access to millions of residential IP addresses to run security scans.
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
Yeah, honestly I wish they'd move that section higher up - it's probably he most genuinely useful tidbit in the article.
As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site.
It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model.
If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason. This alone should end the company. It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should.
---
A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface. People should take advantage of it.
I think the kinds of people with "security models" are not the kinds of people with third-party analytics. They're marketing to people who want it to Just Work.
There's no reason to use SRI any more since caches became partitioned. It won't share the cache between different websites for privacy reasons so you may as well just host the file yourself, and then there's not much reason to use SRI.
SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.
Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I remember a team at my old place bringing down the entire app with insufficient defense around an Optimizely script that failed. Seems bonkers to take on these dependencies and I think it's only going to get worse.
It's a feature. Changes to prod should always be reviewed and this fundamental incompatibility with insecurely hosted JavaScript is a signal that it is a bad idea.
Unfortunately, in this case the insecurely hosted JavaScript is the feature; that is, people who are not responsible for sites going down or breaches want to be able to add things nilly-willy (which therefore necessitates a way to bypass review).
Yes. You install a CSP that says "my site cannot load any scripts from third parties". And then any script you run, you audit thoroughly and then host on your own website, ensuring it doesn't try to load anything third-party.
Never load third-party JavaScript on your site. Zero exceptions.
In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.
I visited at least 2 of the listed sites. I don't own any crypto, so no problem there. I might have entered my credit card details to some site, definitely not to the 2 listed ones. But with the whole "load 300 scripts" cancer in "modern" web you never know.
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
A good reminder to never allow optimizely's shit to run. Here is to uBlock origin and noscript/uMatrix saving the day. Like probably every day the last 15 years or so.
Perhaps at last these unserious names will be abandoned as newsworthy failures become more common in the industry. Viz., gravitas may start to have obvious market value again.
Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?
It's one of those sentences that seems like it's meaningful on first glance but that in reality conveys no information. For whatever reason LLMs are experts at cranking these sentences out.
These are not static scripts. Their content changes frequently. The customer is using them to inject dynamic content into their own sites. What you are describing would not work for this use case.
It's also what they want. They want to change the code frequently, that's the whole point of outsourcing it. Telling people "just don't do the thing you want to do" is not an effective recipe for change.
Yes, AI is making it much easier to hack - you can just spin up a bunch of instances to look for vulnerabilities, you don't even need to do much manual work
Honestly this is getting hilarious. All the shitty decisions everyone made are now coming back to haunt them. It's "I told you so" on a worldwide cyber level.
Before the AI era you could come with a technical/security objection which was correct in theory, but everyone knew the chances of it being exploited were minuscule. In most cases what was to be gained outweighed the costs (this hack collected a mere $7k). Today, saying "this is technically wrong" likely means "it will be used against us".
tl;dr: Someone gained write access to the script Optimizely serves on its customers' websites, and they injected malware.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
the base JS snippet is often the same for all tenants. The script behaviour changes depending the parameters the tenant set on their websites. All the hackers need to do is to gain access to the CDN service where the base snippet is serve, add their payload in the base snippet and it will affect all tenants.
You often don't even need to instruct it to not use 3rd part libraries because in my experience it defaults to creating its own hot mess, furthering your dependence on it
Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
The whole concept of Google Tag Manager was that you could give marketing departments the ability to add "tags" to the website without having to involve engineering. That's how we got 10MB of javascript with every news article.
I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
Client side A/B testing through services like Optimizely and VWO and Adobe Target is a massive security nightmare in of itself. You're giving anyone with access to a third party service the ability to run any code they like on your website, and change any and all interface elements as they see fit.
Even one of these accounts being compromised would be a massive security incident that would potentially put millions of people's data at risk.
Just pointing out that these testing solutions can also be deployed server-side instead of via client-side tags. I suspect that is the route a lot of their customers will take now.
It also makes adding csp a nightmare. Your marketing department is putting in 30 trackers, changing monthly. And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src. You can’t possibly get anything locked down enough. That’s bad for security when you rely on csp for mitigating other factors.
> And then there’s different countries for end clients with different TLDs for connect-src.
Oh how I hate that one. I wish Facebook, Instagram, Google and others would figure out serving the public scripts from .com only.
relying on any client-side "security" is probably a bad idea
CSP is there to protect your user’s browser, not your servers. It’s ultimately their credentials that are going to get compromised with an XSS attack.
All things considered I think CSP is a good thing, a bit of a nuance for website operators, but it probably helps protect against lot of attack types.
What is the alternative when you need to embed third-party JavaScript on your pages? Other than just "not doing that"?
A certificate-based approach for scripts residing on different domains, for example, so you can be sure it hasn't been tampered with.
A javascript file served from example-a.com should be able to run on example-b.org only if it has been signed with the same TLS key used for example-a.com .
Vet everything, cut down to 2-3 services tops. Selfhost analytics whenever possible. Point to the OP article when asked why we can’t blindly put 30 tags using GTM.
Response to your pointing out: "so what?"
Response: "Here's my two weeks notice for leaving, let me know if you want to start caring about users again".
Life's too short to work for people who don't care about others.
You go ahead and find me another job then.
Life’s too short to care about random strangers on the internet sometimes.
> You go ahead and find me another job then.
Buuhoo, life's so hard for SWEs...
What's the point of having "values" and integrity if you never exercise it?
Their response: "ok"
and things continue being insecure
Not doing that. It is just not a secure thing to do.
Other than tracking, what situations are there where "not doing that" is not an option?
Proxy through your own domain? Has its own issues though
That is not any more secure if you are just blindly proxying the third party scripts and in fact is worse since it runs in the context of your own domain.
Since the third party tag can request anything, this doesn't stop anything and now your domain has an open redirect.
Most of it is server to server now with server side tagging. 3rd party cookies are now 1st party and beacon call is server to server.
I mean, really that situation is CSP finally earning its keep. Put whatever you want in tag manager but at the end of the day it's not going to work unless I review it.
> I hope folks are re-evaluating that now.
Not going to happen. Most decisions in tech do not factor in risk, only cost. Risk mitigation usually requires considerable spend, and very few people/companies are willing to spend on low-probability events.
We also get wasted Engineering time tracking down bugs caused by crap being added.
We are indeed re-evaluating it now
What is that saying? A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
That’s why it needs to become criminal for a website to serve malware, including through third party channels like ad networks and analytics services. Serving shit websites is no different than knowingly, or negligently, dumping toxic waste and should be treated the same.
If it's criminal for sites to accidentally serve malware, what does it mean for open source projects to accidentally get hit by supply chain attacks, or for them to get compromised by a rogue contributor (eg. xz)?
Those website operators include third-party code willingly and explicitly. There was never an accident. There is no supply-chain attack here: you cannot seriously claim that unaudited, unauthenticated terminal with root security principal getting used is an attack.
If your website is making any requests outside of the original domain, there's no "accidental" in anything the website does.
Someone _could_ argue that a vibecoded website is doing "accidental" things (like serving malware).
Someone could argue that the sky is green.
Malware is malware. People shouldn’t be offering software that they can’t stand behind.
I see no way to distinguish between huge megacorps and individuals.
A business in the US has legal liability if they fail to do their due diligence in their supply chain and it turns out their suppliers are involved in human trafficking, child labor, forced labor, etc. or is using hazardous materials in the product.
There should be standards that people have to live up to if they are going to provide a product, even for free, to others.
Do they? Without signing up?
Any cases of that being enforced with any significant business ever? What about aiding genocide? (FB, and weapon makers for example)
One could distinguish between criminal negligence and forgivable negligence in court. Unfortunately for GP that probably means you can't actually stick charges on anybody who serves malware via an ad network like this.
> One could distinguish between criminal negligence and forgivable negligence in court.
Open source is already expensive from a time standpoint, you wanna make it expensive from a monetary standpoint too?
Yes. Why should you be allowed to be negligent just because your product is open source?
Software is already hard from functionality standpoint, you wanna make it hard from security standpoint too?
It is already hard from a security standpoint, only that we ignore security.
Easy solution: Don't use ad networks. That'll likely free your site from illegal tracking, as well as ad trash, and will even improve your lIgHtHoUsE score!
Yes. It means the legitimate maintainer of xz would be in prison right now.
Liability should aggregate up to the largest platform involved. Optimizely in this case, I guess. Google for Google Tags.
We should also enforce antitrust laws.
> A person will not understand something that their paycheck requires them to not understand.
I never really understood this idiom, because how can a PHB engineering manager (for example) be required to not understand their team's technology in order to retain their job? Surely if that manager knows their team's work inside out then they would be a more effective manager - which is good for everyone?
If I squint-my-brain, I can see how (for example) that anyone who works full-time as an SEO "consultant" in the year 2026 would only be if they actually believed that SEO tricks actually worked, which requires them to not understand how modern search-engines' spiders actually work (because it's my belief that "SEO" has been either nonsense bollocks - or a complete grift - since the mid-2010s). Am I close?
Because it is not the PHB that starts the problem. It is someone from some other department (usually marketing) who wants tracking, wants it now and wants it done with GTM and will whine to th C-levels until the engineers add Google Tag Manager.
It's not the team's technology that's being referred to. It's about hazards. People whose job it is to do X have a hard time understanding that X shouldn't be done.
In this case, it's the dangers of the tracking and advertising frameworks being used for hostile purposes.
If you're only still there because your boss believes SEO works, you better keep acting like your SEO tricks work.
It's not about actual understanding, but about pretending not to understand — because if one does, they might be out of a job. ;)
"It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends on his not understanding it."
--Upton Sinclair
> it needs to become criminal
I know we really like mass incarceration in America. But maybe start with civil liability and a private right to enforcement?
Even just the process of going to court usually scares people straight even if they don't end up with any liabilities or costs.
this. amen
Just had marketing try to add all OTHER previous page events to a new event, because they didn't want to to go through the trouble of creating a dashboard using the user funnel to this feature.
They knew they could do it, and how, they just didn't want to spend 10 minutes doing it themselves. To them, asking an engineer to do it in code is easier because it only takes a minute to ask.
The funniest part is adding GTM generally means you score low on google's pagespeed metrics through lighthouse
GTM is incredible, really.
I'm programming for over 30 years now and GTM is my personal #1 most hated software.
I am sure. Marketing folks are famous about being reasonable and showing restraint, even if their revenues would suffer.
Good luck with that.
The owners of the ad platforms end up dictating what data is used, they have the leverage and also marketing departments with power end up forcing engineering to use the audience tools Google and Meta provide. At least GTM gets blocked by ad-blockers.
We got 10MB of javascript (maybe 10 years ago...) because engineering needs to build one frontend with multi browser and multi screen support so they picked an off-the-shelf do-everything framework like Amber or Angular, or a react/redux build with 300 nested dependencies.
No, the 10MB (sometimes way more) of JavaScript for a damn news article has nothing to do with SPA frameworks (Angular) or libraries like React. It is tracking malware put there by marketing/advertising idiots.
I remember when this first became a thing when page size was important. I fought tooth and nail with marketing to try and block tag manager. I've had third party URLs block production apps in Chrome before because some marketing url was hosting malicious code.
The most infuriating thing, when you do remove these tags, marketing forgets they exist and are like "Oh we don't use that anymore".
About the "Oh we don't use that anymore.": That shows you the professionalism of the profession.
Often also true for software development, unfortunately.
Porqué no los dos? Both are true. Heavy JS frameworks, ads, trackers, etc., but also heavy web fonts, of which maybe 5 icons are used for the site, but the font weighs a megabyte. Just in case you need it.
Those were decisions at a time engineering was time constrained. All those ancillary things are returning to engineering since its just one more prompt now to manage it.
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability.
In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
> How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
It doesn't cost them anything but a "whoops" post when they fuck up, so the incentive is misaligned (as you noted under repercussions).
The cost is externalised onto everyone else not them so it's not going to change.
This is the only answer
Are you sure? The affected companies are going to totally make Optimizely pay for damages. That could become a lot of money pretty fast. And tbh, I'm not sure that the average ToS's maximum liability ceiling will hold up in court with a blast radius this big.
Usually, the plaintiff/claimant has to prove the damages they suffered, not the damages their (non-paying) users suffered. So then they would have to claim reputation damage or something like that, and that might not be so easy to prove.
It could happen but if you look at the last few decades of losses from software bugs, it’s exceedingly rare for the cost to be more than lost future business, and even that’s unusual. Remember when CrowdStrike brought down businesses around the world and they suffered … having their share price more than double?
https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/CRWD/
Accountability is incompatible with tech sector as it currently exists. The entire ethos of move fast and break things is incompatible with it never mind the shady adtech part of the sector.
Accountability is incompatible with maximising next qtr profits. Modern business culture is rotten.
Partially but don’t think that quite follows. A lot of businesses aren’t as fraught with conflicts of interest as tech.
A company making say bricks has an incentive to cut costs too certainly but they’re not implementing loot boxes, tracking people semi covertly, implementing dark patterns to boost engagement by any means or heaven forbid launching missies based on sketchy AI decisions.
This wasn’t a release. It was their engine that emits the variants being compromised.
> I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
This is the bare minimum. Automatic 3rd party requests should be considered data unsolicited data disclosure under GDPR.
Please tell me in whose incentive it is to change any of this and hold the sites accountable?
Who cares? Next week you forget about this and move on
None of that is part of commercial web dev culture. Leftpad-level dependencies are.
This is likely a result of Optimizely cutting headcount on their legacy product engineering teams to reallocate funding towards their AI product. We’re going to see more stories like this for every company taking a similar approach.
There's a missing step in the explanation. Do major websites like CNN and BBC handle cryptocurrency or credit cards on the same website? Why? Or is there also a browser security bug?
I had the same question, and I really wish these reports would make in clearer what exactly the malware can and can't do. The whole point of web browsers is that sites run in a sandbox so that even if a site does serve malicious code, it should be limited to just that site.
From what I could tell, the malware just generally looked at anything on the page, in cookies/local storage, or clipboard that looks like a crypto address or credit card number. So for sites like CNN or BBC they shouldn't be able to do much damage unless there is a subscription page for example that takes credit card number.
However, the malware also delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits, which do take advantage of browser vulnerabilities in iOS to cause more serious damage.
The report is appalling. The scale of this is enormous. Saying to update your stuff is not helping detect infection.
I feel that whole web site model is broken. They are run in "sandbox" same way AI companies run their sandboxes. Not caring at all where they do call... So every other site needs to implement protections against other sites.
The model is broken on fundamental level and it will never be fixed.
the toolkit appears to also skim credit cards and there are many e-commerce pages in that list.
I'm confused. What exactly would be the point of the iOS exploits? Wouldn't the device just become jailbroken?
This is exactly the kind of use case for NoScript - reduce exposure to potentially malicious content.
Yes. But many, if not most of the affected sites where 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable. Some random ad financed site are different stories, there you might just move on.
> 100% serious businesses. On those you often have have to enable JS to make the site usable.
It's not all or nothing. NoScript [0] lets you run JS (and other specific types of content) from domains and/or sub-domains you allow and reject from those you don't. So you'd allow JS from my-serious-business domain and their CDN, and disallow all else, including those mentioned in the linked article.
[0] https://noscript.net/
Sure I know, I tried NoScript in the past.
It would not have helped here. gitlab.com and my bank are on the list. Obviously I could not have blocked them.
> gitlab.com and my bank are on the list.
Per the linked article, those are not the domains where the malicious JS was served from.
> Some customers serve their snippet from their own domain, such as opt.scheels.com/js/<id>.js or www.vodafone.com.au/js/<id>.js. Those were affected too, because the content comes from the same Optimizely project.
in some cases they were
The article states the opposite, which I’m almost certain was due to the attacker realizing that Content-Security-Policy was blocking the payload on many sites:
“A full inline copy of the payload, which runs through eval if 1688360.cc is blocked.”
Even if they weren't (I have not studied the details), when using NoScript and something does not work you need to enable additional domains. It is infeasible to find the minimal necessary set, so you'll end up with a long allow list.
And an allow list where I’ve made decisions about individual exceptions is a problem why? Do you think having a long list of exceptions is a security problem compared to the entire Internet?
Don't know about noscript specifically, but uMatrix has a default block-list that's safe to enable by default and that includes optimizely. So allowing everything except this default block-list would have protected you from this attack already without any inconvenience of managing allow-lists.
This is simply incorrect. I still use umatrix. On bloated sites there's typically only one or two key domains that need to be permitted. Once you've been running it for a while you can usually guess which ones are needed based on what the grid of resources looks like. Most third party domains aren't required most of the time even for what you described above as "serious businesses". I block most of the third party resources on my bank's website. Honestly the number of dependencies that they pull in absolutely disgusts me; their online banking interface absolutely chugs on low end devices.
I ran uMatrix as well for a long time, and in general there were very few sites where you had to enable JS across the board.
Was a pain though on eCommerce sites as they'd often switch payment processors and then you had to do the whole dance of partially successful payments until you found the right set of allow lists.
Agree, it takes about a week to allow like 60% of pages we visit daily. Then over a month the rest of sites that we occasionally visit. Then there are the pages that completely break when we remove the ad js crap, and then you can take a decision on if you want to continue using that site or not. I have also messages a couple of smaller sites that break when you removed googles tracking, because of the order they load JS, and they promptly fixed it.
I often do so regularly, and have built up passive knowledge about what shit to enable and what not. Optimizely is very far in the realms of shit not getting enabled. I have not had a single instance of it being useful for me as a visitor or user of a website. It does not serve me and it's trash.
However many will put optimizely and things like that proxying through their domains.
If by serious businesses you mean ones that view the inclusion of megabytes of unvetted JS as a security risk and a failure of engineering, there are few serious businesses.
I think uMatrix Origin blocks optimizely by default. It's more user friendly than NoScript.
> We don't know how the attacker got write access to so many unrelated customer projects: a compromised Optimizely system, a compromised credential with cross-customer access, or something else. That's for Optimizely to explain. To be clear, Optimizely's CDN served exactly what it was given; this was not a CDN cache-poisoning attack. Optimizely's own sites were affected as well: the snippets for www.optimizely.com and login.optimizely.com both carried the code.
Interesting that it is not necessarily a supply chain attack a la LiteLLM/some of the other recent breaches. Possibly just a mass compromise of customer passwords.
Optimizely is a pretty garbage platform so this is unsurprising. Love the work though folks like report uri are doing finding this.
Optimizely is slowly dying ever since they forced new customers into their DXP/Saas solution.
Optimizely, or Episerver as it was previously called, was such a pleasure to work on - but since version 13 they more or less vendor locked you into their own authentication (Opti ID / Entra AD (?)) and their Optimizely Graph for search and content look up. You can keep self-hosting but you won't get access to Opti Id or Graph if you're not on their tenant.
I guess this is the inevitable happen - everyone gets hacked at the same time when hosting on a SaaS platform.
Completely true about their auth, each time I have to use their service, it's incredibly complicated to even login, their policies for password expiration are ridiculous and you are constantly prompted to move your credentials to newer systems without any benefit.
All of that for them to mess their own security.
If it was on me, I would stop using them.
> On iPhone/iPad/iPod only: injects boot.js from two .icu hosts and, on iOS ≤ 18.6, a hidden iframe.
Anyone knows what this might be? Can you jailbreak from safari on those versions?
[edit] From the other link, it seems to be Coruna and DarkSword exploits
Why should browsers be allowed to read or write user files without user intervention and serious warnings?
Here the attackers targeted forms, swapping crypto addresses or exfiltrating CC details, they did not read or write user files.
Optimizely Status site: https://status.optimizely.com/
Currently says "Partial Outage Affecting Recommendations Tracking and Reporting"
It’s not that issue, it’s this earlier one: https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z
To be honest I'm surprised that only $7040 was stolen in 9 hours. That seems like a low amount for the amount of traffic the affected sites get in those 9 hours.
Unfortunate with this nonsense slop report for a seemingly significant event like this.
> Your origin can be clean while your visitors are robbed — the compromise sits in the tag layer.
Why do LLMs still produce such unusually awkward phrases, despite being trained on human English?
Model collapse
These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
The models are using language correctly, but their whole universe is limited to a single session. They're not aware that all the previous sessions also used the same phrase, that you've seen it 10 times in the last hour, etc.
Humans naturally avoid repeating the exact same phrases and jokes they just heard from several other sources, but sometimes you can see the same phenomenon with people too: when there's new bullshit phrase or trend spreading through tiktok/instagram (or popular press), there's a brief moment you can catch many normies regurgitating the exact same phrase "independently".
The front of the meme virality wave sure does look weird.
> These phrases are not awkward, it's high-quality human English writing.
It’s not high-quality, though — it’s SEO speak to pad blog posts without adding anything of substance. We notice it more because that stuff is so common in the training data but not the experience of anyone who doesn’t spend time on content mills.
But it's not especially or high quality English either. That phrasing is awkward even in isolation.
Because if you ignore the surrounding context and any broader technical details that are relevant then the phrasing itself in a vacuum isn't awkward at all. In fact I'd say it reads like well polished marketing copy. The trouble is that not only does it not exist in a vacuum but also all of us are sick of what has now become utterly cliche voicing.
there's no such thing as a "tag layer"
If my Origin was "clean" then it wouldn't be loading any scripts from external websites...
ahhh yes, the famous tag layer
That's layer 8 of the OSI model.
It’s right above the egg layer.
Still better than the human slop filter Gizmodo ran it through in their rehashed article. Actual quote:
> On mobile, Report URI says they attempted to install exploit kids.
Subresource Integrity has been available for over a decade. It’s time to start implementing it with these services.
https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
I think it's not used because they are continuously updating their scripts for users.
dupe 2 hours ago, 15 comments: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=50523300
it's been merged
Nope
Hm, which one is the original? The merged article actually looked very informative: https://amirulcyber.com/2026/11/16/optimjack-optimizely-skim...
whereas the one that we are commenting on now looks like an ad: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w...
It opens with:
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect. Our platform can ...
It's otherwise nearly the same information.
It would be kind of ironic if the hijacking warning article got hijacked, I guess?
1. The former seems to have a tiny fraction as much detail as the latter.
2. The former seems super more clear to me to be AI generated prose.
3. The latter explicitly continue talks about the actions they took, that they reached out to the affected parties, etc. From a quick scan, it does not appear that the former claims to have done anything themself?
> "and on iPhones and iPads it [the malware] delivered the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits."
Isn't this anomalous? using RCE root chains in mass-delivered malware? Seems like a new precedent.
There was a report on that last week: https://cyberscoop.com/spyware-attacks-trend-everyday-people...
This stuff is so avoidable but unless we implement meaningful reprocussions things aren't going to change. There is no accountability. In this case optimizely should have had better systems to spot a release like this (internal cool downs, check and balances, phased rolouts, automatic security checks). And sites that have massive user bases (cnn, bbc, etc..) have zero excuse to not have the same.
I would go so far as to say those sites should not be serving from vendors but should be vendoring their own scripts that they also are passing through security audits and serving them selves with cool downs.
How do these companies not have better dedication to protecting their users is beyond me.
Doesn't GTM detect malware, or was this malware only being served to non Google IP addresses? Even so, I'm sure Google has access to millions of residential IP addresses to run security scans.
Is there anything useful served from any *.icu domain? I wonder if I just should block the whole TLD and be done with it.
I think blocking all but ~6-7 tlds should be pretty safe. I have personally seen so rarely malware or phishing hosted in famous tlds.
Risk is when *.icu is guaranteed to be ICU.
Sorry I had to say it ;-)
Let’s say I use Optimizely (I don’t), is there a good best practice to say?:
“yeah load this JS m, but it can’t load / random other JS referencing sketchy places”
Besides specifying scripts by hashes, you can also whitelist various domains: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Guides/CSP (and https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Reference/...)
Feels nice knowing several years ago I worked on forcing CSP (including removing unsafe-eval) on some customers for a site builder product, as they have to manually whitelist domains which limits the impact of these sorts of attacks...
This writeup https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-w... has a section on how CSP helped (or didn't) in this attack.
Yeah, honestly I wish they'd move that section higher up - it's probably he most genuinely useful tidbit in the article.
As an aside - I'm rabidly against "analytics" companies that come in and suggest that the right "getting started" choice is to drop untrusted JS they own (and can update at any time) onto your site.
It's "easy", but it completely breaks your security model.
If I were a lawyer... I'd be taking a serious look at putting optimizely into the meat grinder for recommending 'unsafe-eval' as a script source... it literally has "unsafe" in the fucking name for a reason. This alone should end the company. It won't, because this space is absolutely FILLED with scummy behavior, but it should.
---
A strict CSP is one of the most meaningful ways you have right now as a web developer to reduce attack surface. People should take advantage of it.
There's a reason browser vendors now force basically all extensions into a strict CSP by default... https://developer.chrome.com/docs/extensions/reference/manif... They won't even let you manually relax it anymore.
I think the kinds of people with "security models" are not the kinds of people with third-party analytics. They're marketing to people who want it to Just Work.
Optimizely is widely used within many large Saas companies. Including those with literal legal security requirements (soc 2, iso 27001, etc).
So are equivalent companies that recommend similar strategies. Sprig, segment, amplitude, launchdarkly, heap, full story, etc...
It's a very long list.
They all operate on the same strategy. Pitch to execs that they solve real problems and they have basically no eng cost to implement.
All you need to do is inject them into your page with absolutely no restrictions and let them run any scripts they'd like.
Yes: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
There's no reason to use SRI any more since caches became partitioned. It won't share the cache between different websites for privacy reasons so you may as well just host the file yourself, and then there's not much reason to use SRI.
SRI helps you make sure the script you're loading is what you initially thought, but doesn't ensure that script doesn't load other scripts, no? You need CSP for that.
Specifying scripts by hashes is always a solid defense that platforms like this don't change their script after compromise - but in practice the whole point of optimizely and similar tools it that it's expected the script will change.
Common examples like analytics tools happily change their script bundles whenever they feel like it without just tagging a new version and letting you upgrade.
I wish SRI could be used more,
I remember a team at my old place bringing down the entire app with insufficient defense around an Optimizely script that failed. Seems bonkers to take on these dependencies and I think it's only going to get worse.
It's a feature. Changes to prod should always be reviewed and this fundamental incompatibility with insecurely hosted JavaScript is a signal that it is a bad idea.
Unfortunately, in this case the insecurely hosted JavaScript is the feature; that is, people who are not responsible for sites going down or breaches want to be able to add things nilly-willy (which therefore necessitates a way to bypass review).
this will prevent an unexpected version but doesn't stop a legit but compromised include from loading nefarious resources
Very cool thank you.
Yes. You install a CSP that says "my site cannot load any scripts from third parties". And then any script you run, you audit thoroughly and then host on your own website, ensuring it doesn't try to load anything third-party.
Never load third-party JavaScript on your site. Zero exceptions.
In theory yes, in practice no since every SaaS wants to ship 5 times a day and add 15 new dependencies on other SaaS providers each release, and marketing wants to load gobs of 3rd party tracking and analytics code from their favorite SaaS of the day without having to get approval from those pesky security people. Let's not even mention ad networks.
> This is exactly the kind of attack Report URI is designed to detect.
So is this article just an ad? It makes it hard to tell what's true and what's exaggerated.
This was inevitable and not entirely novel.
https://x.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003 https://x.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
@tehlike is protected
Only followers this account has approved can see its posts.
Sorry my bad. Opened. Not a particularly novel insight either.
Musk-free links:
https://xxcancel.com/tehlike/status/1432082161125888003
https://xxcancel.com/tehlike/status/1467033965215109122
I mean, yes to all the things, CSP, malware checker, CDN etc.
But how do you know that you personally didn't get affected? Check here: https://karlnorling.github.io/optimizely-hack-checker/
what are the practical effects of this? Does this mean that a customer of Zoom was downloading malware all day?
I visited at least 2 of the listed sites. I don't own any crypto, so no problem there. I might have entered my credit card details to some site, definitely not to the 2 listed ones. But with the whole "load 300 scripts" cancer in "modern" web you never know.
I guess all I can do now is emptying my browser cache to be on the safe side. The writeup (piece of marketing for their product) has no section for affected end users
Yes, I sometimes used NoScript and uBlock Matrix, but gave up on those because it's a tedious job to manage your allow lists.
A good reminder to never allow optimizely's shit to run. Here is to uBlock origin and noscript/uMatrix saving the day. Like probably every day the last 15 years or so.
"software is solved" :brainlet:
I still think that running scripts in a browser is a bad idea, but what do I know.
I don't know what you know, but I know something you don't know: how to maximize revenue.
Compromised? They ate grilled cheese off the radiator or what?
Perhaps at last these unserious names will be abandoned as newsworthy failures become more common in the industry. Viz., gravitas may start to have obvious market value again.
Next up the list I'm sure: Sentry.
Every time one of these new attacks drops, you know there's a couple devs at OpenAI that look at each other and go, "This definitely wasn't us, right? ...right?" And how confident are they that out of Outlook, FAA, banks, and now Optimizely skimmer that none of them were either 1) agents up to some fuckery or 2) someone using their system to get up to some fuckery? It can't be 100% confident, right? ...right?
Aren't these all mathematicians who have never had to toil in the operations trenches fixing this stuff, thats why they make 4x my salary right
Can't wait until they start killing hardware
> The malware was a multi-purpose kit.
Somehow this sentence immediately flags this article as AI slop.
It's one of those sentences that seems like it's meaningful on first glance but that in reality conveys no information. For whatever reason LLMs are experts at cranking these sentences out.
This has been in my HOSTS file for a while:
...and now I have another reason to keep it there.Optimizely is such crap... like, all it does is A/B test different landing pages/etc for "conversions." We don't need this.
Reads like an ad to me.
Reminder that this problem has been solved for a while now if admins were not so lazy: https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/Security/Defens...
These are not static scripts. Their content changes frequently. The customer is using them to inject dynamic content into their own sites. What you are describing would not work for this use case.
Loading dynamically changing code from a third party server is a recipe for disaster, which is exactly what was cooked here.
The code should be static and the configuration (data-only) the only thing that changes frequently, but that is less flexible and harder to implement.
It's also what they want. They want to change the code frequently, that's the whole point of outsourcing it. Telling people "just don't do the thing you want to do" is not an effective recipe for change.
Reading this thread has made me realize that intelligence alone is no garlic, cross, or silver bullet against the bored and conspiracy minded.
Optimizely is ~~infected with~~ malware FTFY!
Is it just me or is there an increase of these events or increase of these posts?
Yes, AI is making it much easier to hack - you can just spin up a bunch of instances to look for vulnerabilities, you don't even need to do much manual work
Some of it's real, the rest is a psy-op. It's not hard to figure out what the goal is.
Sorry, what is the goal?
Honestly this is getting hilarious. All the shitty decisions everyone made are now coming back to haunt them. It's "I told you so" on a worldwide cyber level.
Before the AI era you could come with a technical/security objection which was correct in theory, but everyone knew the chances of it being exploited were minuscule. In most cases what was to be gained outweighed the costs (this hack collected a mere $7k). Today, saying "this is technically wrong" likely means "it will be used against us".
tl;dr: Someone gained write access to the script Optimizely serves on its customers' websites, and they injected malware.
What is interesting is that the write access wasn't just for a single customer, but hundreds. So either tenancy isn't strong enough, or the level of access involved in the compromise was pretty severe.
the base JS snippet is often the same for all tenants. The script behaviour changes depending the parameters the tenant set on their websites. All the hackers need to do is to gain access to the CDN service where the base snippet is serve, add their payload in the base snippet and it will affect all tenants.
In the age of AI if you use third party libraries you deserve all hell unleashed on you
First thing I add to my agents.md is do not use third party libraries, frameworks, fonts, icons, etc unless strictly necessary, ask first
You often don't even need to instruct it to not use 3rd part libraries because in my experience it defaults to creating its own hot mess, furthering your dependence on it
Just stop using JS... If you control the server why not have the vendor have a server level integtration that way you are not serving any remote scripts. It would be interesting to do a study on how many of these compromise emnate from third party scripts and I am willing to bet it is over 90%
stop using scripts fullstop the web was never intended to send program code
any program code should run on the webserver
browsers should be minimalist and only support html
and XUL